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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this work, I look at two competitive auction settings where a profit maximizing seller 
chooses auctions as a vehicle to sell to strategic bidders. In both essays, the auctioneer’s problem 
is the selection of the optimal auction format. In the first essay, the auctioneer has a single item 
to sell while in the second essay, there are two items. In this work, I use game theoretic methods 
to derive the best course of action for the buyer and use this to arrive at the best course of action 
for the auctioneer.  
 In essay 1, I consider a hybrid (between English outcry and second price sealed 
bid) auction format where at any point in time, the identity of the highest bidder and the second 
highest price is known to all. I show that this format would generate higher revenues than the 
English outcry format if the bidders’ valuations are interdependent. This is because of lesser risk 
of overpayment and winner’s curse for the bidders in the hybrid auction and consequently, they 
are better off bidding their valuations earlier. Such behavior results in a quicker convergence of 
the outstanding price to the final price realized as the bidders can update their valuations with 
certainty. I test this claim by comparing objects auctioned in Yahoo! and eBay as eBay follows 
the hybrid action format while Yahoo! follows the English outcry format and do find that with 
interdependent object valuations revenue from the hybrid auction format is higher. 
In the second essay, I consider an auctioneer who has two items to sell. These could be 
complements or substitutes or independent products. Given a pool of strategic bidders, I 
 iv
investigate whether he is better off auctioning the items sequentially or as a bundle. To do so, I 
first solve the bidders’ optimization problem and use the solution to arrive at the implications for 
the seller. I find that with a moderate number of bidders (N>4), it is optimal to bundle strong 
complements only. On the other hand for substitutes, I find that bundling is optimal when the 
number of bidders is less than four. 
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 1. DISSERTATION OVERVIEW: COMPETITIVE PRICE FORMATION IN 
AUCTIONS 
1.1. Introduction 
Auctions as a mode of exchanging value have been in existence for a long time. For 
instance Shubik (1983) notes the use of auctions by the Roman army for distribution of war 
spoils. Cassady (1967) mentions the use of auctions in 193A.D. for selling the entire Roman 
Empire after the killing of Emperor Pertinax. Though auctions can be viewed as a special means 
of sales where the seller has a small number of objects, research within marketing concerning 
auctions is a relatively recent phenomenon. This is because the use of auctions prior to the 
success of online auctions sites was rather specialized. However, the above statement does not 
imply that research in auctions is recent. Rather, auction theory was used to tackle various 
problems by economics scholars in special settings. Some important applications include sale of 
treasury bills (Laffont 1997), sale of mineral rights (Hendricks and Porter 1988) and sale of 
broadband spectrum (Krishna and Rosenthal 1996). These specialized applications provided the 
background for the development of auction theory within a game theoretic framework.  
With the popularity of the internet and online auction sites, auctions have attracted the 
attention of marketing scholars. This interest has resulted in work related to auctions in 
marketing where the approach to analysis is game theoretic (e.g., Rothkopf 1991, Rothkopf and 
Harstad 1994, Greenleaf, Rao and Sinha 1993) or involves psychology of consumer behavior 
(e.g., Greenleaf 2004, Kamins, Dreze and Folkes 2004, Dholakia and Simonson 2005). In the 
studies mentioned, we see that the interest in consumer behavior within auctions is a rather new 
development. This is primarily because online auctions predominantly involve settings where 
consumers (rather than firms) interact and trade between themselves. 
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In this work, I look at two settings that are applicable to online auctions. My focus in the 
two essays is the specific aspect of price formation and thus the revenue generated by different 
auction mechanisms. In the first essay, I contrast two online auction formats: English outcry and 
the hybrid auction formats. Existing auction theory (Milgrom and Weber 1982) shows that the 
revenue from the English outcry auction would be no less than the other classical auction 
formats. The English outcry auction involves bids being placed in increments till a point is 
reached where only one bidder remains who then pays the last (and the highest) bid placed. This 
is compared to the second price sealed bid and the first price sealed bid auction. In the second 
price sealed bid auction, each bidder places a single (sealed) bid and upon opening the bids, the 
auctioneer awards the object to the highest bidder at the second highest bid. In the first price 
sealed bid auction, the procedure is the same except the object goes to the highest bidder who 
pays the amount s/he bid.  
The English outcry auction generates higher revenues than the sealed bid auctions in a 
setting where the bidders’ object valuations are interdependent. This is because with an open 
ascending bidding sequence, the bidders can see the bid levels of the bidders and this allows the 
bidder to reassess her valuation of the object. Such a reassessment is not possible in any sealed 
bid auction where only one bid is placed. 
 The above reasoning however, does not take into account a hybrid auction format that 
combines the English outcry and the second price sealed bid auction and this is the focus of the 
first essay. Specifically, I consider a format where at any point in time, the highest bidder and the 
second highest bid are known. The winner of this new auction format is the highest bidder at the 
end of the auction duration where s/he pays the outstanding second highest amount. Since the 
auction involves multiple rounds of bidding, this setup combines features of English outcry and 
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the second price sealed bid auction formats. In the first essay, I compare the revenue from this 
new hybrid format with that from the English outcry format. The hybrid format is used by the 
popular auction website eBay while Yahoo! employs the online English outcry format where the 
bidders place their bids in an increasing sequence. I first show that the hybrid format should 
generate higher revenues than the English outcry format and then test the claim empirically. 
In the second essay, I look at the problem of an auctioneer who has two items to sell to a 
pool of bidders who are in the market for both objects. The objects themselves are complements 
(I later extend the model to look at substitutes) so that the willingness to pay for the bundle is 
greater than the sum of the willingness to pay for the individual objects. In a second price sealed 
bid auction framework, I look at the optimal strategy for bidders and arrive at consequent 
implications for the auctioneer. Specifically, I only consider two possibilities for the seller: sell 
the items as a bundle or sell the items sequentially. Contrary to expectations, I find that it is 
optimal for the seller to unbundle his offering even with moderate complements when there are a 
sufficient number of bidders. Mirroring the above, I also find that with sufficiently few bidders 
(specifically less than 4), it may be optimal to bundle substitutes. I also extend the model to look 
at the role of risk aversion and find that its relevance decreases as the number of bidders 
increases.  
In both essays, I therefore look at how competitive forces shape the process of price 
formation and how this process is influenced by external factors. I choose an auction setting 
primarily due to the increased popularity of online auctions. Though I do not explicitly model the 
second essay along online auctions, the results map on to an online auction situation where the 
bidders place their bids in the last minute. As the title suggests, I look at the problem facing a 
strategic consumer. This is manifested in the framework and parameterization chosen for both 
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essays that reflects the world of B2C and C2C marketplace. This is opposed to the bulk of the 
traditional auction literature that focuses on organizational buying situations (e.g., Krishna and 
Rosenthal 1996, McAfee and McMillan 1992, Hendricks and Porter 1988). However, the 
modeling approach adopted in both essays could be tailored to analyze B2B settings as well. 
1.2. Overview 
1.2.1. Research on Auctions in Marketing 
Following Vickrey’s (1961) seminal paper that developed the second price sealed bid 
auction, there has been a tremendous amount of work in economics regarding auctions. Till a 
few years back, most of the work in auctions was game theoretic in nature (e.g., Riley and 
Samuelson 1981, Maskin and Riley 1996, Myerson 1981) and considered the traditional auction 
format where the supplier and the bidders were required to be present physically at the same 
location for the auction to take place. Also, there had been no serious work in marketing 
literature studying auctions. A notable exception was Hoffman et.al. (1993) that looked at the use 
of auctions in a test market as a means to determine prices. By the beginning of the new century, 
online auctions had caught on in a big way. One implication of the popularity of the internet was 
a renewed interest in auctions not only among economists but also among marketing scholars. 
Thus, there have been studies looking at online auction behavior in economics (c.f. Lucking 
Reiley 2001, Roth and Ockenfels 2002) and also in marketing (e.g., Wilcox 2000, Haubl and 
Popkowski 2003, Ariely and Greenleaf 2000).  
Apart from the popularity of online sites like eBay and Yahoo! there are two additional 
reasons for the surge in auction related work. First, there are subtle differences in the online 
auction rules when compared to the traditional auction setting. For instance, online auctions 
permit last minute bidding or sniping where it is optimal for the bidder to place his bid at the 
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very last moment in the auction. This is because many online auctions have a “hard close” which 
allows the bidder to bid at the last moment. The reason behind this behavior is that by not 
participating in the auction till the very last moment, the bidder holds back information from 
other bidders which they may use to increase their bid for the object. A second reason for the 
increased interest in auctions is the availability of rich data about auctions of various kinds of 
objects which offers many opportunities to empirically test the various theories regarding bidder 
behavior. 
The earlier discussion regarding research on auctions within economics and marketing 
centers around game theoretic models where the auctioneer and the bidders are surplus 
maximizing economic entities. There is limited work in auctions (e.g., Maskin and Riley 1984, 
Matthews 1987, Milgrom and Weber 1982) that considers risk aversion among the bidders 
and/or the auctioneer. A recent phenomenon is the incorporation of psychological aspects of 
bidder behavior. A few notable examples here are Wilcox (2000), Greenleaf (2004) and Haubl 
and Popkowski (2003). Greenleaf (2004) looks at the problem of setting an optimal reserve price 
and its behavioral implications. Haubl and Popokowski (2003) look at the psychological impact 
of a quick versus slow response to bidding in English outcry auctions on competing bidders. 
Specifically, they report that a quicker bid placed by the competition creates an impression of 
higher willingness to pay. Such an emphasis on the behavioral and psychological aspects of the 
auction setting is important in the current world as the online auction scenario is dominated by 
C2C activity and this is the backdrop for this work.  
1.3. Scope and Summary of the First Essay 
In the first essay, I compare two online auction mechanisms and their implications 
regarding the revenue generated. Specifically, I compare the online English outcry auction 
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format and the hybrid auction format. In the online English outcry, the bidders place commonly 
observable bids in an increasing sequence for the object and the object goes to the highest bidder 
who pays the last amount s/he bid. The hybrid format can be visualized as a second price sealed 
bid auction with multiple rounds of bidding. Here, at any point in time, the bidders can see the 
highest bidder and the second highest bid placed. The object finally goes to the highest bidder at 
the second highest price. On one hand, since the bid observed is the second highest, this format 
has some similarity to the second price sealed bid auction. On the other hand, the bidding 
progresses in stages where the bids are placed in an increasing sequence. This gives the format 
some flavor of the English outcry auction.  
For comparing revenue between the auction formats, I look at two leading online auctions 
of today-eBay and Yahoo! in the first essay. Here, I develop a model of bidder behavior to 
understand the conditions under which the eBay auction format would yield greater revenue. I 
develop the central claim theoretically showing the conditions1 under which the revenue from the 
hybrid format would exceed the online English outcry format. This is an interesting result as the 
English outcry auction is known to generate higher revenues than the other auction formats (c.f. 
Milgrom and Weber 1982). However, the existing literature does not consider the hybrid auction 
format. The hybrid auction format however combines the desirable features of English outcry 
and the second price sealed bid auction. The propositions are tested empirically using data 
collected from the respective websites regarding the bid history for 200 matched pairs of objects 
sold at overlapping times2. I find that when the items sold are such that the consumer valuations 
are interdependent, eBay auction format is likely to yield higher revenue than the Yahoo! format. 
                                                 
1 The conditions are absence of last minute bidding and proxy bidding. I discuss these in detail in chapter 2. 
2 Overlapping means that there was a period in time when both auctions were active. For example, if there was a 
Rolex presidential watch auctioned on May 15-22 2000 on eBay, there was another Rolex presidential watch whose 
auction in Yahoo was “alive” sometime between May 15-22 2000. 
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This effect is enhanced if there is lesser instance of last minute bidding. In both auctions, it is 
optimal to bid at the last moment. In the eBay format, if some bidders choose to bid before the 
last minute, the bid levels attracted are likely to be higher than in the Yahoo! format. This has 
two effects: First, the higher levels of earlier bids drives final prices upward and second, the 
eBay format also allows the bidders to update their valuations better resulting in quicker 
convergence of the bid levels to the final price. 
1.4. Scope and Summary of the Second Essay 
In the second essay, I look at the problem faced by an auctioneer who has two objects to 
sell and has to decide whether he should auction them together as a bundle or separately one 
after the other. While doing so, I adopt a second price sealed bid auction framework which is 
quite common in the multi object auction literature (see for instance Krishna and Rosenthal 
1996; Rosenthal and Wang 1996; Chakraborty 2001). In addition to model tractability, the 
second price sealed bid auction resembles an online auction where the bids are placed at the very 
last minute. Upon identifying the optimal bidder behavior, I look at the implications of the 
bidding strategy for the seller. In the basic model, I look at complements that are of similar value 
a priori. I then ask the following questions. First, under what conditions is bundling the objects 
optimal for the auctioneer and when is it optimal to offer the objects sequentially? What is the 
role of risk aversion in sequential auction setting?3 What is the effect of asymmetry in the nature 
of good sold? Does the reasoning in the case of complements extend to substitutes?  
I find that contrary to expectation, the unbundled auction generates higher revenue with 
weak to moderate complements. I also show that as the extent of complementarity increases, the 
bundled auction does better. On the other hand, the number of bidders has the effect of making 
                                                 
3 In the bundled auction, I show that the weakly dominant strategy of bidding one’s valuation is invariant under the 
bidder’s risk preferences. 
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the unbundled auction more attractive. This is primarily because bundling by its nature decreases 
the heterogeneity among the valuations of the bidders whereas there is no such effect in the 
unbundled auction. In the case of substitutes, I find that when the number of bidders is less than 
four, it may be optimal to bundle substitutes. In particular, when the number of bidders is two, it 
is always optimal to bundle and with three bidders, it is optimal to bundle provided the objects 
are not strong substitutes. The reason is that the optimal bidder strategy in the sequential auctions 
involves underbidding for the first object by all bidders and underbidding for the second object 
for the winner of the first auction. This has the effect of reducing the revenue for auctioneer and 
the effect is particularly severe with fewer bidders because the level of bids for the second object 
is greatly reduced. Another surprising result is that with increasing number of bidders, risk 
aversion increasingly becomes irrelevant. The reason is that with more bidders, there is greater 
risk to overbidding as the winner of the first object runs the risk of losing the second.  
1.5. Essays 1 and 2: A Contrast 
Although the essays examine the price formed due to competitive bidder behavior, they 
look at very different settings. In this section, I summarize the contrast between the two essays.  
….…………………………………..Insert Table 1 about here …………………………………… 
As Table 1 shows, essay one is characterized by the auction of a single object while essay two 
looks at two items. In essay one, the primary result regarding greater revenue generated by the 
hybrid format is due to the item sold having interdependent valuation while essay two restricts its 
attention to the case of independent private valuation for the items. In essay 1, the number of 
bidders is exogenous and for the theoretical result, should be the same. In essay 2, the number of 
bidders is also exogenous but plays a crucial role in the auctioneer’s bundling/unbundling 
decision. In essay2, I look at the impact of the number of bidders and as we shall see later, the 
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number of bidders is a key variable in the analysis that not only influences the bid levels but also 
plays an important role in determining the optimal strategy for the auctioneer. Thus, essays 1 and 
2 look at relevant problems for the seller in the online auction marketplace and arrive at optimal 
strategies given rational bidder behavior. 
In addition to the above differences, essay 1 tests the key propositions empirically using 
data collected over the internet while essay 2 is entirely theoretical. Further, the consumer’s 
problem in essay 1 is relatively straightforward while optimal bid choice for the consumer is 
relatively tricky in essay 2. This is because essay 2 considers the strategic bidder facing a 
sequential auction setting. In such a situation, the bidder has to decide on the bid for the first 
object while trading off the possibility of increased surplus if she wins both objects with the 
chances of losing the second object after aggressively bidding for the first. Thus, while both 
essays look at the seller’s problem of choosing the optimal auction format given rational bidders, 
the consumer behavior varies greatly across both settings.  
In the following sections, I first look at the first essay in chapter two followed by the 
second essay in chapter three. This is followed by chapter four that discusses the implications, 
key contributions and areas of future work. 
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2. ESSAY 1: REVENUE EQUIVALENCE IN ONLINE AUCTIONS: THE CASE OF 
YAHOO AND EBAY 
2.1. Introduction 
The past few years have seen Internet auctions emerge as an extremely popular way to 
purchase goods and services. For example, eBay.com had sold goods worth $8 Billion in the first 
quarter of 2004 (La Monica, CNNmoney, April 21, 2004), while on Oct. 25, 2003, Yahoo 
auctions had more than 17,000 antiques and art objects up for auction. The popularity of online 
auctions is largely due to the fact that in the physical world, both the bidders and the seller have 
to be present at the required time and place and the object has to be physically present. Online 
auctions eliminate such restrictions. Due to their popularity and the theoretical distinctions with 
respect to traditional auction theory, online auctions have begun to garner attention within 
marketing (e.g. Chakravarti et al. 2002; Lynch and Ariely 2000; Sinha and Greenleaf 2000; 
Wilcox 2000). 
Online auctions have a somewhat different structure than the auction forms analyzed by 
traditional economic theory (Seidmann and Varkat 2000; Wilcox 2000). For instance, 
Yahoo.com allows bidders to bid on an object at any point in time in the specified auction 
duration. Thus, bidders are free to exit and re-enter, which is in contrast to the way traditional 
auctions are conceptualized in economic theory. EBay, on the other hand, is an auction that 
represents a hybrid of two types of auctions, the second-price sealed-bid and English outcry 
auctions (Shah, Joshi, and Wurman 2002; Wilcox 2000). In the second-price sealed-bid auction, 
each bidder presents a single sealed-bid for the object. The bids are opened simultaneously and 
the object goes to the highest bidder at the second highest bid. In the most common variant of the 
English outcry auction, the bidders bid for the object in an increasing sequence, that is – each 
bidder bids above the current highest price until a point is reached where no bidder is willing to 
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bid above the current bid. The object is then awarded to the bidder with the highest bid at that 
price.  
The auction format of eBay that I examine combines features of second price sealed bid 
auction and the English outcry auction. Here, the bidders submit bids for the object online. At 
any time, only the second highest bid is shown and the object goes to the highest bidder at the 
second highest bid at the end of the auction. However, like an English auction, the bidders can 
place more than one bid during the course of the auction. In this essay, I call the eBay format the 
hybrid auction format. 
I use the properties of English outcry and second-price sealed-bid auctions to develop 
testable propositions. These are tested using data from 200 pairs of auctions of identical objects 
on Yahoo and eBay. I first show analytically that the revenue form the hybrid auction is no less 
than that of the English outcry auction with re-entry when the object being auctioned has some 
common value component. This means that for each bidder, the value of the object being 
auctioned depends on its value to other bidders. This is followed by an empirical study using a 
natural experiment where I compare the revenue generated by both auction formats.  
I also test several ancillary propositions. First I propose that the revenue increases in both 
the above auction formats with the number of bidders. Second, I examine if convergence to the 
final price is likely to be faster for the hybrid auction format than that for the English outcry 
format. Third, I look at the impact of last minute bidding on each auction form. While last 
minute bidding is optimal for the bidders in both the auction formats, I argue that the resulting 
decrease in revenue (when compared to the case where there is no last minute bidding) is greater 
for the English outcry auction than that for the hybrid auction format. Finally I propose that on 
average, each bidder will bid fewer times in the hybrid auction format than in the English outcry 
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format. The reason is that the bidders should bid higher in the hybrid auction than in the English 
outcry auction when they bid initially and thus the chances of revising their bid upwards should 
be lower. 
2.2. Background and Research Issues 
Auction theory comprises a large body of literature in economics beginning with Vickrey 
(1961), who outlined the second-price auction for the first time. He assumed that each bidder 
knows how much the object is worth to him/her (the reservation value) with certainty. However, 
this reservation value varies between bidders. This condition is known as the independent private 
value (IPV) condition. This situation is in contrast to auctions with a common value component 
where the valuation of each bidder may depend on the valuations of the other bidders. The 
concepts of independent private value (i.e., the case considered by Vickrey 1961) and common 
value were formalized within a game theoretic framework by Milgrom and Weber (1982), whose 
work has been the basis for subsequent auction theory research. Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
prove the revenue equivalence theorem where under the independent private value assumption; 
the revenue from the English outcry and the second-price sealed-bid auction formats is the same. 
The basic results from the studies dealing with auctions are summarized by McAfee and 
McMillan (1987), Milgrom (1989) and more recently by Klemperer (1999). The key result is that 
for independent private value goods, there is revenue equivalence between the four auction forms 
(Dutch, first-price sealed-bid, second-price sealed-bid and English outcry). However, for goods 
with a common value component, the English outcry format generates the greatest revenue. I 
argue that in the online context, the hybrid auction format should generate even greater revenue 
than the English outcry format.  
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For this study, the main conclusion pertains to the situation where common value and 
buyer risk aversion hold. Both of these are relevant and highly realistic assumptions for online 
auctions. In the presence of risk aversion, bidders in the English outcry auction tend to bid closer 
to their reservation values (as they prefer smaller profits with greater certainty) and thus generate 
higher revenue for the seller. In contrast, for bidders in the second-price sealed-bid auction, it is 
optimal to bid the reservation price. However, there is no information gained regarding the 
valuations of the other bidders as each bidder bids only once. This is the central argument that 
leads to the result of Milgrom and Weber (1981, 1982) where they show that the English outcry 
auction format generates the greater expected revenue for the seller when compared to the 
second price sealed bid auction.  
I examine the hybrid auction that can potentially generate higher revenues than the 
English outcry auction. I first theoretically establish the conditions under which the hybrid 
auction is likely to generate greater revenues than the English outcry auction in section 3.1. 
Having done this, I test this empirically by comparing the revenue generated by both formats for 
identical objects using a natural experiment.  
2.2.1. Last Minute Bidding in Online Auctions 
I look at last minute bidding in detail as this behavior is peculiar to online auctions and 
can play an important role in the final price realized by the auctioneer. Last minute bidding 
implies that bidders wait until the very end to place their bids. This is optimal for the bidder, as 
she does not reveal any information to the other bidders in the auction process. This means that 
other bidders do not get the opportunity to revise their valuations after inferring the bidder’s 
valuation from his/her bid. Of course, this behavior would not impact revenue in auctions where 
bidders have independent private valuation, as the valuation of the bidders does not depend on 
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the valuations of others. Last minute bidding behavior is peculiar to online auctions, because in a 
conventional English outcry auction, if there is a period of no bidding activity, the auction would 
end automatically. 
The impact of last minute bidding in online auctions has been experimentally explored by 
Wilcox (2000) who finds that last minute bidding is optimal for the bidders in any ascending 
online auction, but reduces revenue for the seller. In an auction for a good having some common 
value component, it is optimal for the bidders to refrain from bidding and not reveal their 
valuation as this information could drive the competing bidders’ valuation upwards. Wilcox 
(2000) found that bidders in eBay with greater experience tend to place their bids at the last 
moment. I build on Wilcox (2000) by comparing the role of last minute bidding for both the 
hybrid auction and the English outcry auction. One of the key aspects of this study is that I 
control for last minute bidding behavior and explain the reason for the different levels of 
influence exerted by this phenomenon on both auction formats. 
Roth and Ockenfels (2000, 2002) develop an analytical model for explaining last minute 
bidding where they compare the bidding behavior in Amazon.com and eBay.com. They develop 
a game-theoretic framework where they consider two conflicting effects - the benefit and the risk 
of bidding at the last moment. The benefit is that the bidder does not reveal her private valuation 
to others. The cost is that the bidder risks her bid not being registered on time with the auction 
site. They find significant last minute bidding in both Amazon and eBay auction houses and 
report that last minute bidding is more pronounced for goods with a common value component 
than for independent private value goods. This result is intuitive, as the value of information 
revealed is greater in the case of goods with a common value component. I build on this by 
looking at the speed with which the outstanding price approaches the final price in both auction 
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formats. This allows me to examine the impact of the information revealed by each bid in both 
the formats. 
2.3. Propositions 
2.3.1. Revenue Equivalence in Common Value Auctions 
Analytical work in economics has shown that the expected revenue generated in the 
second-price sealed-bid and the English auction formats is the same in the case of independent 
private value objects (e.g. Milgrom and Weber 1982; Myerson 1981; Vickrey 1961). We can 
extend this result for the case of the hybrid auction and the English outcry formats. This is 
because in case of independent private value, bidders have an incentive to bid no more than their 
valuation. Specifically, in a hybrid auction, the bidders have no incentive to pay beyond their 
valuation and should thus never bid anything other than their valuations, and in an English 
auction bidders should bid up to their valuations. In both cases, the expected revenue realized 
would be the same as the valuation of the second highest bidder. The key here is that the bidding 
behavior of the other bidders does not affect the valuation of any bidder in any way. 
However, in the case of goods with a common value component, the above equivalence 
may not hold. To see this, consider the auction of an object in a hybrid auction. The optimal 
bidding behavior in the hybrid auction (or any auction with free entry and exit) is to bid at the 
last moment. If a bidder chooses to bid anytime prior to the last moment, it is optimal to bid her 
valuation (or reservation price) at that point in time. This is because bidding lower only reduces 
the possibility of her bid being the high price and bidding higher is unnecessarily risky as she is 
faced with a possibility of paying an amount higher than her willingness to pay for the object.  
It may appear that the bidders in the hybrid auction would bid low initially and then 
slowly increase their bid as in any English auction to either (a) distort the valuation (related to 
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his/her own) of the other bidders or to (b) indulge in exploratory bidding. However, both are 
suboptimal. In the first case, the best way to distort is to not bid at all. Mathematically, if the 
valuation function of the bidders is of the form V (x1,……..,xn), n being the number of bidders, 
and xn being the private signal of the nth bidder, V (.) is non-decreasing in all of its arguments. 
Consequently, any bid would not decrease the valuation of any bidder. Also, any bid lower than 
the second highest bid in hybrid auction would not register at all. Thus, any such attempts at 
distortion are dominated by not bidding at all. In the case of exploratory bidding, due to the 
auction being second-price, the bidder gains little insight into the high valuation by bidding low 
values beforehand. Thus, the bidders wait till the last moment to place their bid. If they are 
unsure about their availability at the last moment, they would place their bid before the last 
moment during the duration of the auction. 
If each bidder were better off bidding her valuation at that point in time, why would any 
bidder bid more than once in a hybrid auction? The answer has to be that the bidder has revised 
her valuation upwards upon observing the bidding process. Given this behavior, each bidder 
would not only bid more than once, but also bid his/her reservation price at that point in time. As 
such, from the earlier argument, it is easier for the bidders to assess the valuation of the other 
bidders because all bidders bid their reservation values for the object. The updating of the 
reservation value (due to the auction having a common value component) is also consequently 
more efficient when compared to the English outcry where it is assumed that the reservation 
values are inferred by looking at the bids. However, this updating is not possible in a second-
price sealed-bid auction, as there is only one bid. Thus, the valuations of the other bidders are not 
revealed. Consequently, there is no updating as in the English outcry auction during the bidding 
process. Also, as there is only one bid (i.e., the reservation value of each bidder) in a second-
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price sealed-bid auction, there is no role for risk aversion in this auction type. The above 
discussion leads us to Proposition 1.1:4
Proposition 1.1: If the object being sold has a common value component, the hybrid 
auction format generates higher revenue compared to the English outcry format with re-
entry. 
 
2.3.2. Number of Bidders 
The number of bidders is likely to have a positive effect on the final revenue realized 
(Riley and Samuelson 1981; Vickrey 1961; Wilson 1977). Such an effect should occur due to 
two reasons. First, when there are more bidders, it is more likely that some bidders will have a 
greater valuation. Typically, the bidder valuations are modeled as drawn from a uniform 
distribution between the lowest and the highest possible value for the object (e.g., Milgrom and 
Weber 1982). Thus, probabilistically, as the number of bidders grows, so does the likelihood of 
some bidder’s valuation being at the higher end of the distribution. Intuitively, the result should 
hold for any distribution as more bidders would increase the chances of a higher realization for 
the greatest valuation. Second, with risk aversion, the bidders recognize this fact and bid closer 
to their own valuation. Thus I propose: 
Proposition 1.2: All else being equal, the prices realized in the hybrid auction and 
English outcry auctions increase with the number of bidders. 
 
 
2.3.3. Convergence to Final Price 
From the discussion following proposition 1.1, we can see that it is easier for the bidders 
to update their valuation upwards in the hybrid auction format versus the English outcry format. 
Such bidding behavior allows rapid updating of the valuation by each bidder when compared to a 
situation where the bidder only observes incrementally increasing bids as in an English outcry 
                                                 
4 I theoretically derive the conditions required for Proposition 1 in appendix A. In appendix A, I also derive 
conditions where the revenue from both formats should be the same. Specifically, I show that the expected revenue 
should be the same when there is no last minute bidding. 
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auction. Thus, it is likely that it would require fewer bids to push the outstanding price in the 
hybrid auction to the final price than in an English outcry auction. For example, if the second 
highest bidder’s valuation were $3500, it may take many rounds of bidding for the outstanding 
price to reach $3500 in an English outcry auction. However, in the hybrid auction, this would be 
reached in the second round, as the bidders would bid their valuation at any point in time. Thus, 
we expect that the speed of convergence of the bid levels to the final price realized should be 
greater in the hybrid auction format followed by eBay. Formally: 
Proposition 1.3: The rate of convergence of the outstanding bid levels to the final price 
realized is greater for the hybrid auction format as compared to the English outcry 
format. 
 
2.3.4. Impact of Last Minute Bidding 
It is optimal for bidders in any ascending online auction to bid at the last minute. 
However, I argue that this effect is more pronounced in the case of English outcry than for the 
hybrid auction. Consider first the extreme case where all the bidders bid at the last minute (pure 
last minute bidding case). In the case of the English outcry auction, since the highest bidder pays 
the amount she bids and everybody can place only one bid, the situation is the same as in the 
first-price sealed-bid auction. On the other hand, in the hybrid auction if everyone bids only once 
at the last minute and the amount paid is the second highest bid, the situation is the same as in a 
second price sealed bid auction.  
It has been shown analytically in Milgrom and Weber (1982) that in the presence of a 
common value component, the second price sealed bid auction generates higher expected 
revenue than the first price sealed bid auction. In our context, this means that the hybrid auction 
should generate greater revenues than the English outcry auction in the presence of common 
value and when every bidder bids at the last minute. When all bidders do not bid at the last 
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minute, last minute bidding should decrease the revenue from English outcry. This is because, 
with fewer bids to condition upon, there is a smaller chance for any bidder to revise her valuation 
upwards. This effect is less intense for the hybrid auction, as even with few bids in the duration 
of the auction; the outstanding price is already quite high. In other words, in an online context 
last minute bidding should have a smaller influence on the hybrid auction than in English outcry 
auctions. This leads us to: 
Proposition 1.4: The presence of last minute bidding decreases the revenues from the 
English outcry and hybrid auction formats. However, the decrease is greater for the 
English outcry than for the hybrid auction. 
 
2.3.5. Number of Bids per Bidder 
As discussed earlier, the need for multiple bids by any bidder arises in the hybrid auction 
only if her reservation value has changed upwards. In contrast, this would not happen many 
times in the English outcry auction because there would be less opportunity for the bidders to 
revise their valuation. Thus the number of bids per bidder should be smaller in hybrid auction 
than in English outcry. To further clarify this argument, consider the car auction. Suppose Bidder 
A is uncertain only about the quality of the tires. If the tires were old, she would be willing to 
pay $4500. However, if the tires were new, she would pay $5000. Since Bidder A is risk averse, 
in a hybrid auction, s/he bids $4500. Now s/he spots another bidder (Bidder B), who knows the 
true quality of the tires. S/he knows that if B bids $4500, the tires would be of good quality. 
Upon seeing this bid of B (or discovering that her own bid is the second highest), Bidder A is 
then convinced that the true value of the car is $5000 and bids $5000. However, notice that such 
a process would take longer in English outcry because in English outcry, Bidder A would reach 
the price of $4500 only after many rounds of bidding, because Bidder A would not want to bid 
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his/her reservation price to get the car. Thus, it would require a greater number of bids from A 
and B. Thus: 
Proposition 1.5: The number of bids made by any bidder will be smaller in the hybrid 
auction than in English outcry. 
2.4. Research Setting 
To test the propositions, I compare bidding on eBay.com and Yahoo.com. Both are very 
successful online-auction sites, though they use different formats. EBay has the same format as 
the hybrid auction and Yahoo.com has the same format as an English outcry auction with finite 
time duration. Before moving ahead, I look at some of the rules of the online counterparts of the 
hybrid auction and English outcry formats – Yahoo and eBay auctions. 
In Yahoo, the bidders can place bids on the object for sale any number of times within the 
finite auction duration. The object then goes to the highest bidder at the end of the auction at the 
price bid by him. These characteristics make Yahoo an English auction with free entry. EBay is a 
format that has not been analyzed theoretically and due to arguments presented earlier should 
produce greater revenue than the English auction. In eBay, the bidders can place bids for the 
object any number of times during the course of the auction, but the bidders at any point in time 
only know the second highest bid. These are the characteristics of the hybrid auction as discussed 
earlier. Thus, eBay has the same format as a hybrid auction. Recall that the hybrid auction was 
defined earlier as an auction that combines the properties of the English outcry and the second-
price sealed-bid auction formats. Here, the second highest bid and the name of the highest bidder 
are known at any point in time. 
It should be noted that there are some special rules governing the two sites apart from the 
“regular” rules for English outcry and hybrid auctions. In both Yahoo and eBay auctions, the 
seller may specify a “buy price” and any bidder may claim the object for the buy price by 
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bidding the buy price and the auction ends immediately with the bidder paying the buy price to 
the seller. Another special rule in Yahoo is the facility of proxy bidding for the players. Here, 
each player can specify the high bid till which she would be willing to compete given the current 
situation (in the bidding process) so that she need not place a fresh bid every time any other 
bidder tops her bid by the given bid increment. The auction site then automatically bids a higher 
price - outstanding price plus the bid increment by proxy. For both Yahoo and eBay, the auctions 
are of finite duration pre-specified by the seller. I include a dummy variable for the buy price to 
account for its effect. I code the auctions where the bidders exercise the option as a dummy 
variable similar to that in Yahoo.   
2.5. Data and Analysis 
2.5.1. Data Description 
Auctions for 200 pairs of objects in Yahoo and eBay were compared such that the objects 
selected were identical in form and with respect to the promotional features. For example in 
eBay, if a photograph of the laptop accompanies the auction of a DellTM laptop, care was taken 
that the auction for the same DellTM laptop in Yahoo carried the same photograph and the same 
hardware and software configuration. I also ensured that the auctions took place at the same 
period. Specifically, the auctions included in the data were such that the duration of auction for 
the object in both sites overlapped. In the above example it means that if the auction for the 
laptop took place from August 23-August 30 in eBay, then the auction for the same laptop with 
the same features in Yahoo was ‘alive’ in at least one day of the above period (for example from 
August 17- 24).  
Descriptive data from the auctions is shown in Table 2, in which three important 
comparisons are evident. First, there is no statistical difference between the auction duration in 
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eBay and Yahoo. The average duration for eBay is 5.63 and for Yahoo it is 5.67. Second, the 
average number of bidders is slightly greater in eBay (7.00) than in Yahoo (5.26). I account for 
this in the analysis by including separate variables for these. Finally, last minute bidding is 
somewhat more prevalent in eBay (88 of the 200 auctions) than in Yahoo (62 of the 200 
auctions).  
.…………………………………..Insert Table 2 about here ……………………………………… 
2.5.2. Variable Description 
2.5.2.1. Presence or Absence of Common Value (COMM)  
I infer the presence of common value for eBay auctions by examining the bid history for 
multiple bids made by two or more bidders in the course of the auction. If multiple bids are 
observed, then common value is inferred, as multiple bids in second-price auctions such as eBay 
indicate that the valuation of the object has changed for the particular individual. If common 
value was present, this dummy variable was coded as 1, otherwise 0.5
2.5.2.2. Presence of Jump Bidding (JUMP)  
Jump bidding refers to the phenomenon where a bidder places a bid much higher than the 
existing outstanding bid when there is no clear compulsion to do so. For example, consider the 
auction of a car. In the English outcry format, if the current bid were $3000, with a bid increment 
(specified by the seller) of $200, a bid of $6000 (as opposed to say $3200 or $3300) would be a 
jump bid. Avery (1998) demonstrated analytically that preemptive jump bidding by one of the 
bidders is likely to reduce the final price realized in an English auction. Jump bidding signals to 
the other bidders that engaging in a bidding war would result in winner’s curse for the other 
                                                 
5 I also tried a coding scheme where extent of common value was coded as 
Bids
Bidders
#
#
. The results were 
unchanged. 
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bidder. Note that this is not applicable in the case of the hybrid auction (or any second-price 
auction) where the jump bid is not observed. This takes away the advantage the jump bidder may 
be able to extract through such tactics. Thus, while testing the hypotheses, we need to control for 
the effect of jump bidding. 
I infer jump bidding in Yahoo if any bid exceeded the previous high bid by 30% of the 
final sale price. This is a conservative coding scheme. For example, consider a Rolex Watch 
being sold in Yahoo with no reserve price. If the current high (outstanding) bid is $20 with a 
minimum bid increment of $5, a bid of $50 is a jump bid in a strict sense, but considering that 
the approximate value of the new watch would be much higher (say $1500) such a jump bid does 
not act as a preemptive jump bid in the spirit of Avery (1998). I also tried 20% and 40% cutoff 
levels and the results were unchanged. Because the highest bid is not observed in a hybrid 
auction (i.e., eBay), it is not possible for the bidder to signal aggression using pre-emptive jump 
bidding in the spirit of Avery (1998). Thus, I do not consider jump bidding for eBay. 
2.5.2.3. Buy Price (BUYPRICE (Y) and BUYNOW (E))  
This is a dummy variable that indicates whether the object was sold using the buy price 
option in Yahoo or eBay. For some auctions in Yahoo (eBay), the seller offers a “Buy-it-Now-
Price” option so that any bidder bidding the buy price gets the object and immediately the 
auction ends. For example, if a laptop is being auctioned and the current price is $35 and the buy 
price is $500, any bidder can claim the object at $500 ending the auction immediately.6  
2.5.2.4. First Bid/Reserve price (RESERVE (E) and RESERVE (Y))  
The presence of a reserve price might affect the final selling price in the auction (McAfee 
and Vincent 1992; Milgrom and Weber 1982; Riley and Samuelson 1981). It is also intuitive to 
                                                 
6 While coding jump bids in Yahoo, we excluded objects bought at the buy price. Instead of being a jump bid, this is 
deemed to be preemptive buying and thus is not coded as a jump bid. 
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see that a reserve price may automatically provide a higher start for the auction. Additionally, 
behavioral considerations may actually impact the choice of reserve price set by the auctioneer 
(Greenleaf 2004). I control for this variable by including the reserve price or the price at which 
the auction begins for Yahoo. In eBay, the reserve price is unknown to the bidders. However, the 
seller sets a minimum first bid which is known to the bidders and the role of this first bid is the 
same as that of the reserve price. I thus use the value of the stipulated first bid for eBay as the 
reserve.  
2.5.2.5. Number of Bidders (BIDS (E) and BIDS (Y))  
Proposition 1.2 predicts that the number of bidders will positively affect the final price 
realized in an auction. In the model, BIDS (E) and BIDS (Y) represent the number of bidders in 
eBay and Yahoo, respectively. 
2.5.2.6. Auction Duration (DUR (E) and DUR (Y))  
One implication of proposition 1.3 is that the duration of the auction will positively affect 
the revenue realized in the auction. This is because given any point in the auction duration, the 
price realized as a proportion of the final price would be greater for eBay than for Yahoo! Thus, 
any increase in the auction duration is likely to benefit more to the seller in Yahoo! than in eBay. 
Further, the auction duration is an important control variable for testing proposition 1.1. These 
are coded as DUR (E) and DUR (Y) and are the duration of the auction in days for eBay and 
Yahoo, respectively.  
2.5.2.7 Last Minute Bidding (LAST (E) and LAST (Y))  
Per Proposition 1.4, last minute bidding will adversely affect the revenue realized in both 
hybrid auction and English outcry auctions, more so for the English outcry format. Thus, I 
include dummy variables to represent last minute bidding. If there was a bid placed by any 
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bidder in the very last minute of the auction, the dummy variable was coded as 1; otherwise it 
was coded as 0. LAST (E) and LAST (Y) represent these dummy variables for eBay and Yahoo, 
respectively. 
2.6. Model Specification and Estimation 
In this section I discuss the model specification and estimation. I first present the test 
used for the first (main) proposition in detail. The tests for the remaining propositions are 
presented later in this section. I test the first proposition using seemingly unrelated regression 
(Zellner 1962). I use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) because we need to isolate the effect 
of the common value condition on the revenue realized. In order to do this, I account for the 
effect of the variables common to eBay and Yahoo by including them in the system of equations 
that I estimate. Further, while I infer the presence of common value in eBay, there is no such 
indicator for Yahoo. For testing, I model the prices realized as follows: 
(1a)  EPrice=α1+b1DUR (E) +b2BIDS (E) +b3LAST (E) +b4RESERVE (E) + b5 
BUYNOW(E) +b6COMM +ε 
(1b)  YPrice=α2+γ1DUR (Y) + γ2BIDS (Y) + γ3LAST (Y) + γ4RESERVE (Y) + γ5JUMP+ 
γ6BUYPRICE(Y)+ε 
where  
• EPrice is the price realized for the object in eBay 
• YPrice is the price realized in Yahoo 
• DUR(E) and DUR(Y) represent the auction duration in eBay and Yahoo respectively in 
days 
• BIDS(E) and BIDS(Y) are the number of bidders in eBay and Yahoo  
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• LAST(E) and LAST(Y) indicate the presence of last minute bidding in eBay and Yahoo 
respectively 
• RESERVE(E) and RESERVE (Y) represent the stipulated first bid in eBay and the 
Reserve price set in Yahoo respectively 
• BUYPRICE(Y) and BUYNOW(E) take the value 1 if the Buy price (Buy it Now) option 
in Yahoo (eBay) is exercised 
• COMM represents the inferred presence of Common Valuation in eBay 
• JUMP indicates the presence of Jump bidding in the Yahoo auction 
I estimate two more models that relate the progression of price in the auction to the time 
elapsed in the auction. First, I formulate the outstanding price at any point in time as a quadratic 
function of the time elapsed. I call this Equation 2 and estimate the following regressions: 
(2a) EPrice=γ1t + γ2t2 + ε 
(2b) YPrice=λ1t + λ2t2 + ε 
In the above, the coefficients γ2 and λ2 capture the relative speed with which the final 
price is reached and t represents the fraction of the effective time elapsed in the auction. This 
model is used to test Proposition 1.3, which predicts that increase in revenue due to increased 
auction duration is greater for the English outcry auction. In our context, I expect the prices in 
eBay price to converge more rapidly than in Yahoo. That is, we expect to see γ2< λ2 and γ1>λ1. 
The last model that I estimate is Model 3 that is similar to Model 2 but is used for testing 
Proposition 1.4. This is described below. 
(3a) EPrice’=γ’1t + γ’2t2 + ε 
(3b) YPrice’=λ’1t + λ’2t2 + ε 
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In model 3, EPrice’ and YPrice’ represent the prices in the final stages of the auction. To 
do this, I look at the bidding data after 80% of the auction duration is past. For example, if the 
auction duration is 5 days, the data considered for Model 3 is the last day only. Thus, I pay closer 
attention to the bidding behavior in the final stages of the auction. Consistent with Proposition 
1.4 and the assumptions underlying Proposition 1.1, I expect both γ’1>λ’1 and γ’2< λ’2. 7
I operationalize the variables in Models 2 and 3 as follows. In model 2, I normalize the 
values of price and time so that the data across all the auctions is comparable. I do this by 
specifying the price at any point in time as a fraction of the final price. Thus I also account for 
the role of reserve price, because it represents an artificially high starting point for the bids and 
therefore the ask price. To explain the adjustment, if the total duration of the auction is T and the 
first bid is placed at t0<T, then, the effective auction duration=T-t0. Now, if the final price 
realized is P and denoting the reserve price by R, the effective ask price is taken to be = βt= (bt-
R)/ (P-R) where 
• Bid placed at time t ∈ [0, T]:   bt 
• Reserve Price:     R 
• First bid:     b0 
Thus, I adjust the first bid so that it reflects the increase over the reserve price. Therefore, 
I now track the increase in the ask price net of the reserve. This ensures that all the auctions can 
be compared irrespective of the reserve price. Model 2 estimates how fast the outstanding ask 
price converges to the final selling price. I take the first bid as the starting point by considering 
the auction to have begun only after the first bid is placed. Thus, as shown above, the effective 
                                                 
7 We conducted the above regressions with cutoffs where 70% and 90% of the auction duration was over and the 
results were identical.   
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auction duration is the time left in the auction after the first bid is placed. Thus, if the total 
number of bids is K, I can index the time of each bid bt by the bid number k ∈{1….K} as  
 
bt =τt= (t(k+1)-t0)/(T-t0). When t=T, τT=1, bT=P and βT=1 and where, bt∈[0,1] and 
τt∈[0,1]. 
This normalization is done for each auction and the resulting τt and βt form the dataset for 
the regression estimated in Model 2. A similar exercise achieves the required normalization for 
Model 3. The only difference is that in Model 3, the price at the time when four fifth (as opposed 
to initial time) of the auction is over is set to be zero and the final price is set to be 1. I then 
regress τt against βt for all auctions. In Models 2 and 3, the intercept is set to zero as the first bid 
corresponds to the reserve price. In Model 2, γ2< λ2 and γ1>λ1 would imply that the convergence 
to the final price is more rapid. Model 2 is relevant to the propositions in two ways. First, I 
assume in Proposition 1.1 that each bidder bids his/her valuation in the hybrid auction and thus, 
multiple bidding by any bidder reveals the presence of common value. Greater concavity in 
Model 2a compared to 2b will support this thesis, as it implies that bids move towards the final 
value more rapidly in the hybrid auction than in the English outcry auction. Second, relevant to 
Proposition 1.2, γ2< λ2 and γ1>λ1 would show that the scope for increase in revenue with 
increased auction duration is smaller for the hybrid auction than for the English outcry auction. 
Finally, Model 2 with the parameters in the expected direction offers indirect evidence for 
Proposition 1.5 as greater concavity (or lesser convexity) in Model 2a compared to 2b will 
indicate that fewer bids are required to reach the final price in eBay than in Yahoo. 
 Model 3 tests proposition 1.4 in the following manner. In model 3, γ’1>λ’1 and γ’2< λ’2 
implies that last minute bidding has a lower impact on eBay than for Yahoo. The inequalities 
 28
γ’1>λ’1 and γ’2< λ’2 would then imply that a greater proportion of the final price would be reached 
in eBay and in Yahoo. In other words, as we move towards the end of the auction, the difference 
between the final price realized and the outstanding bid price is lower in the case of eBay then 
for Yahoo. Now consider a bidder seeing the outstanding price and bidding in the last minute in 
Yahoo. The situation faced by the bidder is the same as in the first price sealed bid auction with a 
known reserve price and thus a low value of the reserve lowers the final bid when compared to a 
situation where the reserve is higher (Milgrom and Weber 1982). A greater number of bidders 
bidding at the last moment imply a lower outstanding price at the final minute. This then implies 
that the final price realized is thus lowered as more bidders bid at the last minute. Summarizing 
the discussion of the tests and the models developed, Table 3 shows the various restrictions and 
the propositions tested along with the relevant results observed. 
.….…………………………..Insert Table 3 about here…..……………………………… 
2.7. Results 
I estimate a series of restricted models to test our propositions. These are detailed in 
Table 3. Proposition 1.1 predicts that revenue from the hybrid auction will be greater than that 
from the English outcry format. I test this proposition using Models 1a and 1b. First, I estimate a 
SUR between Models 1a and 1b while ignoring the variable COMM and test the restriction 
α1=α2. I then re-estimate the SUR after including COMM and test the restriction α1+b1 =α2’. 
Here the variable α2 refers to the intercept in Model 1b while estimating the SUR by ignoring the 
variable COMM in Model 1a, and α2’ refers to the intercept in Model 1b while estimating the 
SUR after including COMM in Model 1a. 
I do the estimation described above using SUR where the coefficients for duration, 
number of bidders, buy price, reserve price and last minute bidding are restricted to be equal. In 
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other words, the restriction, α1= α2 is tested while restricting b2=γ2 (Number of Bidders), b3=γ3 
(last minute bidding), b4=γ4 (reserve price), b5=γ5 (exercise of the buy price option) and, b6=γ6 
(auction duration). These restrictions allow us to see the contribution of common value while 
keeping the other factors constant across both auction formats. Following this, I sequentially 
relax the above restrictions and repeat the estimation till I reach the case where no parameter is 
restricted to be equal across the system (the unrestricted case). Proposition 1 would be supported 
if the parameter corresponding to COMM(b1) is positive and significant. I also estimate models 
1a and 1b without including the variable COMM and contrast the results. This is done because 
there is no proxy for common value for yahoo auctions. Thus, the alternative specification 
(without including COMM) lets us see if there is any meaningful contribution by adding the 
common value term for eBay. For example, if we find that the revenue from eBay is increased if 
COMM is excluded, the proposition would not be supported (this would be indicated if the F-
Value of rejection of α1=α2 is greater than the F-Value of the rejection of α1+b1 =α2’).  
..….…………………………..Insert Table 4 about here…...……………………………… 
Table 4 reads as follows. The columns referred by Test 1-Test 6 indicate relaxation of the 
equality constraints sequentially where Test 1 refers to the situation where four parameters 
(duration, last minute bidding, reserve and the use of the buy price facility) are restricted and 
Test 6 is the unrestricted case where no parameters are restricted to be equal across the two 
models. The F-values and the corresponding significance of the difference are shown in the last 
two rows. 
In Table 4, the estimate for common value is positive and significant for eBay. As we 
would expect, the coefficient for reserve (in eBay, this is the stipulated minimum first bid) is 
positive. However, it is not significant when the common value variable is included. One 
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possible reason is that the influence of common value is so strong that it overshadows the impact 
of the reserve price. Another possible reason is that though reserve price insures the seller against 
very low prices, it does little in yielding a high final price. Thus, I conclude that using a reserve 
price is optimal for Yahoo but the gains are modest considering the final price realized. The 
estimates for duration, bids and last minute bidding have the expected signs for both auction 
forms except for the unrestricted case where the estimate for last minute bidding is positive in 
eBay.  
The estimate for buy price for eBay is positive but again is not significant. In Yahoo!, the 
estimates are not significant but the sign varies with the nature of restrictions imposed. As such, 
the decision of setting the buy price is non-trivial and has benefits for buyers and the seller as this
adds flexibility for both the auctioneer and the bidder by allowing direct purchase. Since I use 
buy price only as a control variable, I do not study this further. Finally, the estimate for jump 
bidding is positive but not significant. Given the role of jump bidding as studied by Avery 
(1998), we would expect that jump bidding would depress expected revenue (as pre-emptive 
jump bidding discourages other bidders) and thus expect the estimate to be negative. However, 
the estimate is non-significant. Likely a bigger sample would yield interpretable results. 
As seen from table 4, Proposition 1.1 is supported. This is because the estimate for 
COMM is positive and significant (at p<.05 for all cases except when all the variables common 
to eBay and Yahoo! are restricted to be equal when p<.1). Also as required, the value of α1 +b1 is 
always statistically greater than α2’. For example in Test 2 (Column B2), 289.07***+51.28** > 
249.68*** (F = 26.27). I also see that α1 is always statistically greater than α2. For example, in 
Column B1 323.81***>250.05*** (F= 22.64). Thus, both restrictions are rejected with the F Value 
being greater for the former restriction than for the latter. This implies that the difference 
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between (α1 +b1) and α2’ is larger than the difference between α1 and α2 in terms of F-value 
(25.70>22.95). These results show that revenue in the hybrid auction format is greater when 
compared to the English outcry format and the difference is greater if common value is included. 
I also repeat the above process by relaxing the restrictions on the coefficients for Yahoo and 
eBay and find that Proposition 1.1 holds.  
Proposition 1.2 predicts that the prices realized in the hybrid auction and English outcry 
auctions will be higher with more bidders present. This proposition would be supported by 
positive coefficients for BIDS (E) and BIDS(Y). The coefficient is non-significant for eBay, but 
significant for Yahoo is. Thus, Proposition 1.2 is only partially supported.  
……………………………………..Insert Table 5 about here …………………………………… 
Proposition 1.3 states that the rate of convergence of the outstanding bid to the final price 
realized would be greater for the hybrid format (eBay) than for English outcry (Yahoo!). This 
proposition is tested using Model 2 and the results are shown in Table 5. Proposition 1.3 would 
be supported by a greater convexity in the case of Yahoo in Model 2. Models 2a and 2b in Table 
5 (see Figure 1 also) support Proposition 1.3. Specifically, γ1> λ1 (0.64>0.45) and γ2 < λ2 
(0.36<0.55). 
.….………………………….Insert Figure 1 about here ………………………………….. 
Proposition 1.4 states that last minute bidding will have a negative impact on both eBay 
and Yahoo auctions but the impact will be smaller for eBay. The proposition would be supported 
by a greater degree of concavity (or lesser convexity) in Model 3a than in Model 3b. From Table 
5, we see that this is indeed the case. Specifically, γ’1> λ’1 (0.35>0.02) and γ’2 < λ’2 (0.65<0.98). 
The intuition is made clear if we draw a line near the end of the auction duration in Figure 1. We 
see that in eBay, a greater outstanding ask price (as a percentage of the final price) is achieved in 
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the final stages of the auction as compared to the Yahoo auction. This means that if the bidders 
do not bid at the last minute, the decrease in the final price would be smaller for eBay as 
compared to Yahoo. 
Proposition 1.5 states that the number of bids made by any bidder is likely to be smaller 
in the hybrid auction than in English outcry. To test this proposition, I computed the ratio of the 
number of bids to the number of bidders for each auction in Yahoo and eBay separately. For our 
proposition to be supported, this ratio should be significantly greater for Yahoo than for eBay. I 
performed a one-tailed test of difference of means to examine the difference. The mean 
Bidders
Bids proportion for eBay is 1.99 and it is 2.88 for Yahoo (Z=7.15, p<.01). Thus, I find that 
Proposition 1.5 is supported.8  
2.8. Discussion 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, I analyzed an 
alternative auction format that is widely used and identify properties due to which it could yield 
higher revenues than the English outcry auction format. Second, I adopt a different approach 
from the predominant focus on independent private valued objects (Chakravarti et al. 2002; 
Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong 1995) in empirical work on auctions. One example of empirical 
research comparing English outcry and second-price sealed-bid auctions in a natural setting is 
the one by Lucking-Reiley (1999). However, this work confines itself to testing the revenue 
equivalence principle (for independent private value auctions) and is not concerned with online 
auctions. In contrast, I consider objects that have a common value component and control for a 
host of other characteristics peculiar to online auctions in a natural setting. Third, I propose that a 
                                                 
8 For testing Proposition 5, we only had 162 observations. We had to discard some of the data due to missing bid 
information and the auctions where Buy price was exercised by the bidders, as this artificially reduces the number of 
bids. 
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second-price auction with a few modifications can dominate an English outcry auction. This is 
surprising, and implies that the eBay auction format merits further attention regarding its revenue 
properties.  
I argue that eBay generates greater revenue than Yahoo or any other English auction 
under the conditions stated in Proposition 1.1. It would be interesting to see how eBay revenue 
compares with a slightly modified auction format like Amazon that takes away the advantage of 
last minute bidding. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) contrast the properties of eBay and Amazon 
auctions, but no study examines revenue equivalence in online auctions. However, it is difficult 
to imagine any auction setup that matches eBay in the sheer efficiency of information utilization 
by the bidders. Fourth, this is the first study that looks at revenue equivalence empirically 
(between the English outcry and the hybrid auction format) using the eBay auction format.  
 Fifth, I show how the hybrid auction works to mitigate the damaging effect (to the seller) 
of last minute bidding to the seller (Model 3). This is also seen in Figure 1: the outstanding price 
in the hybrid auction approaches the final price more rapidly than in the English outcry format. 
In an online auction, it is weakly dominant for any bidder to bid at the last moment because by 
doing so the bidder does not reveal his/her signal. If all bidders do the same, there is little 
opportunity for other bidders to update their valuation and this reduces the overall final price 
resulting to the seller. Roth and Ockenfels (2000, 2002) and Wilcox (2000) look at last minute 
bidding in auctions but do not relate it to the revenue realized. In contrast, I consider last minute 
bidding in a revenue equivalence context. 
Finally, this study offers an interesting alternative (but not necessarily competing) 
explanation for the success of eBay. As we have seen, it is more likely that eBay fetches a better 
price than Yahoo, making it more attractive to potential sellers. This in turn drives greater 
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demand because of increased choice for potential buyers in eBay (due to more sellers). Thus, I 
think that the greater supply in eBay generates its own higher demand, resulting in its popularity 
over Yahoo. Though other reasons such as first mover advantage (Cohen 2002) may also have 
benefited eBay, our results suggest that one reason for its continued popularity is fundamental to 
its auction mechanism. This is a key insight from our analysis. 
Wolfstetter, Perry and Zamir (2000) look at another auction format with two rounds of 
second-price sealed-bid auctions where the second round has only the highest two bidders from 
the first round. With the constraint that they cannot bid lower than they bid earlier, they prove 
that this is equivalent to the English auction. The above result is interesting, as the format 
considered in Wolfstetter et al. (2000) is very similar to eBay. The only addition in eBay 
compared to the format they consider is that there are many such rounds of bidding with free 
entry and exit of all players at any time in the course of the auction. This gives eBay additional 
flexibility than the system proposed by Wolfstetter et al. (2000). It may be possible that it is this 
flexibility that results in the revenue realized from eBay higher than the format studied by 
Wolfstetter et al (2000).  
It is also worthwhile dwelling on the results of Models 2 and 3. One may wonder why the 
price/time curves for Yahoo and eBay are so close. Looking at the bidding history of the various 
auctions, I feel that the following explanation is the most plausible. As already discussed, in any 
auction with free entry and exit, it is optimal for each bidder to bid at the last moment. If any 
bidder does choose to bid before that in the hybrid auction, s/he has nothing better to bid than 
his/her valuation at that point in time. However, this is not always the case and many bidders do 
resort to bidding incrementally above the ask price. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) refer to such 
behavior as “incremental bidding.” Thus, we can readily see that even if a few of the bidders 
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engage in such behavior, the result is slower convergence of the bids to the final price. However, 
the presence of other bidders ensures that the final (higher) price is reached quickly (relative to 
an English auction where there is no incentive to bid one’s own valuation). Also, in our study, I 
did not look at proxy bids that are a feature of the Yahoo auction. Proxy bidding in effect reduces 
the number of effective bids and thus increases the degree of concavity of price vs. time in an 
English outcry auction. Finally, the facility of proxy bidding in Yahoo auctions allows the 
bidders to bid higher than they would normally bid in an English outcry. In fact, if all bidders 
were to use proxy bidding in Yahoo, the yahoo auction format would be the same as the eBay 
auction format. Proxy bidding therefore increases the speed of convergence of bids to the final 
price in Yahoo making our test more conservative (as proxy bidding works in the opposite 
direction of our proposition).  
2.9. Limitations and Future Research 
While I took care to control for potential bias due to auction date, number of bidders, last 
minute bidding and specific auction rules, there are inevitably some limitations. First, I implicitly 
assume that the number of items available in a site for auction does not greatly impact the overall 
selling price achieved. This is because greater number of objects for sale implies greater number 
of buyers also. Thus, the increase in demand would be matched by increase in supply.  However, 
I have taken care to see that there are as many bids as possible in each auction history analyzed 
to neutralize this effect. 
Second, common value was coded as 0 or 1. This may be a bit drastic and a better 
measure may be one with a continuum of values between 0 and 1 to reflect extent of common 
value. However, it is unclear as to how this can be done objectively. As mentioned in footnote 2, 
I tried another measure by using the average number of bids placed by each bidder as a proxy for 
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the extent of common value. Although our proposition holds in this case also, I feel that the 
theoretical justification of our assumptions for coding common value to be 0 or 1 is more robust 
given the broad nature of Proposition 1.1.  
In conclusion, we see that in the presence of common values, the eBay auction tends to 
dominate the Yahoo auction. Such a study of bidding behavior can augment traditional test 
markets for arriving at the long-term price of the product for the marketer. This study could 
provide directions as to the possibility of increasing price over the long run with sustained usage. 
This is because the sustained usage would allow the users to reassess the value of the object. By 
identifying the categories/products (and the ranking of categories where the updating is more 
likely) where this is possible, the marketer can have useful inputs for long-term pricing. For 
example, if an object sells for a higher value in the eBay format than with Yahoo, then the 
marketer can infer the possibility of price increase after the introductory period. In an earlier 
study, Hoffman et al. (1993) look at auctions as a mechanism to replace test marketing in 
arriving at the price. This research offers another step in the same direction. 
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3. ESSAY 2: MULTI-OBJECT AUCTIONS OF COMPLEMENTS OR 
SUBSTITUTES: THE OPTIMALITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF BUNDLING VS. 
SEQUENCING 
3.1. Introduction 
 Long regarded as the favored mode of exchange among connoisseurs and collectors of 
vintage wine and fine art, auctions have captured the imagination of the general public on the 
growing strength of online auction sites such as eBay and Yahoo.  Revenues at eBay have 
jumped from $86.1 Million in 19989 to $1.53 Billion for the first two quarters of 2004 with a 
gross transaction value of $16 Billion over the two quarters10.  The volume of B2B auctions 
through exchanges such as Ariba and CommerceOne has been even more impressive; optimistic 
projections of the gross transaction value for 2004 in the US approach $750 Billion (see Pekec 
and Rothkopf 2003; Sashi and O’Leary 2002).   
These trends notwithstanding, auctions have received limited attention in the marketing 
literature.  While the auction literature in economics is rich and diverse (see Klemperer 1999 for 
a review), even here the overwhelming focus has been on the auctions of individual objects.  The 
few recent auction-related studies within marketing have delved into issues such as mechanism 
design and revenue implications in the context of such products as wine (Lynch and Ariely 
2000), beef (Hoffman et al. 1993) and high value art (Greenleaf, Sinha, and Rao 1993).  In 
contrast to these studies, we see many objects amenable to auctions as natural complements or 
substitutes of each other, and I find it entirely feasible to auction off a bundle of such objects.  
Examples would include telecast rights for the summer and winter Olympics, tickets for 
successive World Series baseball games, and a set of JFK’s golf clubs.  On the other hand, if a 
seller intends to auction such objects separately, it begs the questions whether a particular 
                                                 
9 eBay Profit and Loss Statement 1998 
10 eBay unaudited results http://investor.ebay.com/news/Q204/EBAY072104-139863.pdf and eBay.com. 
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auction sequence would be the best and what the revenue impact would be.  Thus, the central 
issue of this study is whether, and under what conditions, should a revenue maximizing seller of 
a set of complements or substitutes auction them as a bundle or separately, in two sequential 
auctions. 
 To be sure, part of the motivation for this work comes from an emerging stream of 
research on B2B auctions involving multiple objects (e.g., Benoit and Krishna 2001; 
Chakraborty 2002; Levine 1997).  While these articles do examine the relative attractiveness of 
sequential vs. simultaneous auctions for a seller of two or more products, this study builds on this 
stream by considering a broader gamut of product - and market-based variables: substitute, 
independent and complementary objects, asymmetry in valuations of the objects, and risk 
seeking propensity of the bidders.  I see this orientation offering several fresh insights.  
 Conceptually, this study is motivated by the bundling literature that closely examines the 
interrelatedness (i.e., complementarity or substitutability) among product offerings (e.g., 
Guiltinan 1987).  This research has defined two products as complements (or substitutes) when a 
consumer’s reservation price for the bundle of the two products is greater (or less) than the sum 
of the reservation prices for the two products taken individually (cf. Lewbel 1985; Venkatesh 
and Kamakura 2003).  This literature suggests that the optimality of a particular bundling 
strategy depends on the number of offerings, the degree to which the products are substitutes or 
complements, and the level of marginal costs.  (I will review the auction and bundling literatures 
in the next section and position the study and its contributions in relation to them.) 
 In this study I examine the multi-object auction problem in a second price, sealed bid 
format – from the standpoint of a revenue maximizing seller and address the following questions:  
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• Under what conditions (e.g., the degree of interrelatedness among products and the 
number of prospective bidders) should the portfolio of products be auctioned 
simultaneously - as a bundle, or sequentially - as individual objects? 
• How should the seller modify the auctioning strategy if bidders are risk averse and 
not risk neutral? 
• If the objects are valued differently by the market (e.g., a more valuable Super Bowl 
ticket plus a less valuable Bowl souvenir), should the higher valued object be 
auctioned first or second? 
The bidders in my model are strategic.  I address the following questions that relate to them: 
• How aggressively (i.e., how much more than the reservation price for the object in 
question) should one bid?  How would this strategy differ for complements and 
substitutes, and in the presence of value asymmetry and bidders’ risk aversion? 
 
 My model yields closed form, pure strategy Nash equilibria of the bidders’ strategies 
when the objects are offered separately or as a bundle.  While these results suffice to answer the 
bidder-related questions, I rely on related simulation of a large number of auctions to infer the 
strategic guidelines for the seller.  I find that the domain of optimality of auctioning a bundle of 
complements or substitutes is negatively related to the available pool of bidders.  The optimality 
of bundling is not a given for all complements: even with a few bidders (at least four), sequential 
auctions are revenue maximizing for weak to moderate complements.  In such cases, the seller’s 
gain from the cascading effect of competition in sequential auctions can offset that from reduced 
buyer heterogeneity for the bundle.  When the objects are asymmetric in their market value, it is 
revenue enhancing to auction the higher valued object first.  The rationale is that the bidding is 
not only more aggressive for the first object but also positively related to magnitude of its 
perceived value.  
It is optimal for all bidders to bid above their reservation prices in the first of sequential 
auctions of complements.  Independent of the moderating factors I consider, the bid for the 
second object should be linked to the incremental value of this object and unrelated to the first 
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bid.  The bid for the bundle is straightforward and should equal the reservation price.  For 
substitutes, on the other hand, it is best for the bidders to shade their bid downwards (bid less 
than their reservation price) for the first object.  This is because the first round winner becomes 
less interested in the second object; the reduced competition increases the first round loser’s odds 
of winning the second item. 
 The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows.  I position the study in section 2 
in relation to representative articles on multi-object auctions and bundling.  Next, I propose the 
model in section 3 and lay out five propositions in section 4.  I then consider two key extensions 
of the main model in section 5 and conclude the paper with a discussion of the key findings, the 
study’s limitations and future research directions. 
3.2. Literature 
 As the motivation for our problem and modeling approach comes in part from the multi-
object auctions literature and from the bundling literature on interrelated objects, I will draw 
attention to key previous studies and highlight the distinctive and complementary aspects of ours. 
 Studies on multi-object auctions have considered identical objects such as multiple 
bottles of vintage wine (e.g., Krishna and Rosenthal 1996; Lynch and Ariely 2000) as well as 
distinct objects (e.g., Avery and Hendershott 2000; Benoit and Krishna 2001).  While the typical 
study has looked at independently valued objects (e.g., Chakraborty 2002; Palfrey 1983), recent 
exceptions have explored complements (cf. Benoit and Krishna 2001).  The only substitutes 
considered are those that perfectly replace each other (e.g., Palfrey 1983). The Vickrey 
auction is the format of choice (e.g., Krishna and Rosenthal 1996; Rosenthal and Wang 1996).  
The seller’s objective is typically to maximize revenues (e.g., Benoit and Krishna 2001; 
Chakraborty 2002) although auction efficiency has also been considered (e.g., Levin 1997; 
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Palfrey 1983).  The articles are about evenly split between objects with independent private 
value (e.g., Krishna and Rosenthal 1996) and common value (e.g., Rosenthal and Wang 1996). 
 Along the above categorizing dimensions, I have chosen the following as some of our 
model’s core characteristics:  
• Multiple bidders (≥ 2) 
• Two non-identical objects, given our focus on the bundling decision as opposed to the 
quantity decision 
• Independent private value, as our primary thrust is on bidders who are users and not 
resellers of the objects. 
 I summarize the key findings of these studies and position this study in Table 6.   
 
.….……………………………..Insert Table 6 about here…..…………………………… 
As discussed here, the distinguishing aspects of this study come from the consideration of 
the impact of the following additional characteristics: 
• A degree of interrelatedness among the products that could vary from strong 
substitutability to strong complementarity 
• The interaction between the above and the number of bidders 
• Risk propensity of the bidders: risk neutral or risk averse; the latter might be more 
relevant in some B2C auction settings that attract infrequent bidders 
• Both symmetric and asymmetric market valuations; the latter is intended to capture 
scenarios in which one of the objects is seen to be of “lesser” value (e.g., a DVD, as 
compared to a DVD player); this draws attention to the question whether a particular 
sequence matters to the seller. 
 
I will highlight and elaborate on the strategic significance of the above in §3.4 and §3.5.   
The literature on bundling contrasts the appeal of unbundling (i.e., pure components), 
pure bundling (akin to simultaneous sales) and mixed bundling strategies (i.e., sales of the 
objects individually and in combination).  Bundling dominates unbundling for substitutes and 
complements when the marginal costs are negligible (cf. Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999).  The 
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result is reversed when marginal costs are moderate relative to the market’s willingness to pay, 
whereas – when the marginal costs are high – unbundling (or bundling) is more profitable for 
substitutes (or complements) (cf. Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003).  Marginal costs are arguably 
absent in an auction setting as the seller already possesses the objects.  So is bundling the 
revenue maximizing strategy in an auction setting?  It is not always so, as we will see later.   
 Insights from extant bundling research do not readily extend to auctions for several 
reasons.  First, traditional bundling is a form of second-degree price discrimination whereas 
auctions arguably map on to price discrimination of the more potent first-degree.  Second, 
whereas the traditional bundling results apply typically for a setting devoid of supply constraints, 
limited supply is the hallmark of the auction problem.  The restricted supply also means that the 
strategy of mixed bundling that balances penetration and profits might be irrelevant in an 
auctioning context.  Third, under traditional bundling with a monopolist, the game structure is 
simpler because the seller only has to ensure that the bundle or the components meet the buyer’s 
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.  Under auctions, buyers must act 
strategically to balance their individual valuations and the anticipated bidding behavior of 
competing bidders so as to maximize expected surplus.  In sum, I see the problem of our study at 
the interface of bundling and standard auction literature, and contributing to both streams.  
3.3. The Model 
3.3.1. The Product Market 
The seller in our model is also the auctioneer.  S/he has one unit each of two objects ‘A’ 
and ‘B’ and seeks to maximize the expected revenue from selling them.11  The objects are hard 
for interested consumers to find outside of the auction.  The two-object formulation is consistent 
                                                 
11 Maximizing expected revenue and expected profit are equivalent in a typical auction setting because seller is 
already in possession of the two objects and so the costs that s/he incurred in procuring them are sunk.   
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with the setting in several extant articles on auctions (e.g., Avery and Hendershott 2000; Hausch 
1986) and bundling (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; Schmalensee 1984).  Our seller has chosen 
the second price sealed-bid Vickrey auction format following earlier precedents (e.g., Krishna 
and Rosenthal 1996; Chakraborty 2002). Also the format closely resembles those on eBay and 
Yahoo.12  The seller has to decide whether to offer the objects in a single bundled lot or 
separately in two sequential auctions.  This decision of the seller will be common knowledge 
before the auction begins.   
Totally, N+1 potential bidders are interested in purchasing the objects at incentive 
compatible prices.  This number is known exogenously as in Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) and 
Chakraborty (2002).  The minimum size of the bidder pool is 2 – the auction is meaningless 
otherwise.  The bidders have private values for the objects being auctioned, and are risk neutral 
in that they expect their surplus from the auctions to be non-negative.  The bidders see the two 
auctioned objects as complements of one another.  (I consider substitutes in §5.)  The degree of 
complementarity is parameterized as θ such that, if any bidder j’s reservation prices for objects A 
and B taken separately are RjA and RjB, and that for the bundle is RjAB, then: 
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For a given object pair AB, the bidders in our model perceive the same degree of 
complementarity θ  – a common assumption in the literature (e.g., Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999; 
Moorthy 1988; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003).  For two independently valued objects, θ  is 
zero.  The greater the synergistic effect of complementarity, higher the θ value.  Consistent with 
                                                 
12 For example, both these real world auction sites involve proxy bidding in which it is it is optimal to bid at the last 
moment (cf. Roth and Ockenfels 2000, Wilcox 2000).  Thus, if all bidders bid at the last moment, the auctions 
reduce to the second-price sealed bid format. 
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McAfee and Vincent (1997) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) in the auction literature and 
Carbajo et al. (1990) and Seidmann (1991) on bundling, I assume that the reservation prices of 
the bidders for each object taken alone are independent draws from a uniform distribution in [0, 
V].  This also means that the two products are symmetric in value at the market level.  Further, as 
I consider two distinct objects, each bidder’s reservation prices RjA and RjB for the objects taken 
alone are independent of each other (as in Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999).  As each bidder’s 
valuation of the bundle is (1+θ) times the sum of the reservation prices of the two objects taken 
alone, it follows that the bidders’ reservation prices for the bundle follow a triangular 
distribution, with support [0, 2V(1+θ)] and mean V(1+θ).  All of the above information at the 
market level is common knowledge except the specific, individual-level realizations of 
reservation prices RjA and RjB, which are known only to each individual bidder j; i.e., RjA and RjB 
are private value as in Palfrey (1983). 
3.3.2. The Bidding Process 
The seller decides first whether to auction the objects separately or as a bundle.  After 
this decision, the buyers decide and place their bids.  I derive the equilibrium strategies for the 
bidders in the subgames where the bidders make their choices and, in turn, infer the seller’s 
optimal strategy.   
When the seller auctions the objects as a bundle, the bidding decision is straightforward 
as the offering is a single – albeit composite – object.  In such a situation, each bidder’s best bid, 
denoted bjAB, can be no better than her reservation price for the bundle.  In other words, bidding 
one’s reservation price is a weakly dominant strategy.  This is because reservation prices are 
independent (i.e., one bidder’s reservation price does not affect another’s) and private, and in a 
second price sealed bid auction it is then optimal to bid the valuation (Milgrom and Weber 1982; 
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Vickrey 1961).  The revenue is thus the amount of the second highest bid which, as before, is the 
second highest bidder’s reservation price. 
If the seller offers the objects in two separate and sequential auctions, the bidding 
decisions turn out to be considerably trickier.  As additional notation, I denote bidder j’s bid for 
object A as bjA.  If j is the winner of the first auction, then her bid for object B is bjB; otherwise it 
is .  The bidders are strategic while bidding on the first object.  Any given bidder considers 
the following factors:  
jBb′
• There are four possible outcomes: (i) the bidder could win the first object and go on to 
win the second object as well; (ii) the bidder could win the first object but end up losing 
the second; (iii) the bidder could lose the first object and yet win the second; (iv) the 
bidder could lose both objects.  The bidder tries to maximize one’s expected surplus 
given these possibilities 
• The winner of the first object could gain an upper hand in the eventual bid for the second 
object.  This is because none of the other bidders has any chance of realizing the benefit 
of complementarity (as they can only win the second object at best).  In other words, 
there is some incentive in the first auction to bid aggressively – that is, bid more than 
one’s reservation price for the first object 
• The incentive to bid aggressively on the first object must be tempered by the realization 
that the winning bidder could lose the second object and end up with a negative surplus at 
the end of the day.  This could happen if, for example, one of the first round losers has a 
high reservation price for the second taken alone and makes a strong bid. 
With the first bid over and the results announced, some of the above uncertainties are 
resolved.  Each bidder knows if she won or lost the object and the price paid by the winner.  The 
winner is aware of her surplus from the first object.  She would bid on the second object so as 
not to bring down – and possibly increase – her surplus from the first.  All the first round losers 
bid their reservation prices for the second object.  Doing so is a weakly dominant strategy for 
these bidders for reasons discussed under the earlier case of auctioning the bundle.  The winner 
of the second auction and the price paid by her are subsequently revealed. 
The complete game as it unfolds is shown in Figure 2.   
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...……………………………..Insert Figure2 about here…...…………………………… 
The seller’s original decision of whether to auction the objects as a bundle or sequentially 
as two separate auctions must be based on how the game unfolds at the bidders’ level.  The 
equilibrium bids of the sellers are a critical driver of the seller’s decision.  I derive the Nash 
equlibria by backward induction.   
3.3.3. The Equilibrium Bids 
For reasons discussed earlier, the equilibrium bids are straightforward when the objects 
are auctioned as a bundle, and given by:  
Result 1: The pure strategy Nash equilibrium bid of bidder j for bundle AB is RjAB ∀ j. 
This is the weakly dominant strategy in a second price sealed bid auction with 
independent private valuations and follows from Vickrey (1961, p. 20) for a single object.  
I will devote the rest of this section to the equilibria under sequential auctions.  As the 
winning bidder pays the equivalent of the second highest bid, each bidder j maximizes the 
expected surplus from the auction.  The bidder’s expected surplus13 is given by: 
Expected Surplus of j = I + II + III (2) 
where  I = , (3) { Bundle  thefrom Surplus
ObjectsBoth  Winning
ofy Probabilit      ×⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ }
}
                                                
II = , and  (4) { }AObject  from Surplus
BObject  Losing and
AObject   Winning
ofy Probabilit     
×
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
III = . (5) { BObject  from Surplus
BObject   Winningand
AObject  Losing 
ofy Probabilit    
×
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
 
 
13 The formulation in equation (2) is equivalent to the backward induction rule of a bidder maximizing P(Winning 
A)×(Surplus from A) + P(Winning B│Won A) × (Incremental surplus) + P(Winning B│Lost A) × (Surplus from B). 
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In the above, the probability of bidder j winning (or losing) an object refers to the probability that 
her bid is greater (or less) than the highest of the remaining bids, and the surplus from the object 
contingent on winning it represents the difference between the bidder’s reservation price for the 
object less the second highest bid for that object.  It is also evident that losing both objects leads 
to a surplus of zero.  Based on the notation developed thus far, equation (2) can be represented 
mathematically as: 
Surplus= 
{ } { }
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The three multiplicative pairs on the right hand side of equation (6) correspond to those of 
equations (3), (4) and (5). 
 To determine the equilibrium bid for A (i.e., the first of the auctioned objects), each 
bidder j must assess how her reservation prices for the objects (taken separately) and for the 
bundle measure up against specific thresholds.  Let us note parenthetically that this is an 
analytical requirement intended to assess the cumulative probabilities correctly.  The bidders 
move simultaneously with their first bid, and we have: 
Result 2: The pure strategy Nash equilibrium bids of j for objects A and B are: 
When (RjAB-RjA)≤V: 
 48
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
≤<+++
+++−+−+
−+
≤≤++−+
−+
= +++
+
++
VRV
VNNN
VVRNNRNN
VN
RR
R
VR
VN
R
VN
RR
R
b
jBN
NN
jB
N
jB
N
N
jAjAB
jA
jBN
N
jB
N
N
jAjAB
jA
jA
θθ
θθ
θθθ
 when 
1212
22122
1
0   when 
1221
111
1
21
*  
When (RjAB-RjA) > V: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
     
  when 
1212
22122
1
   when 
1221
11
1
2
*
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
≤≤
+++
+++−+
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
<
++
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
=
++
+
+
VRV
VNNN
VVRNNRNN
V
N
N
R
VR
VN
R
V
N
N
R
b
jBN
NN
jB
N
jB
jAB
jBN
N
jB
jAB
jA
θ
θ
θθ
θ
θθ  
In all cases: =R*
jB
b jAB-RjA;  =R* 'jBb jB.
The proof is in Appendix C.  While I will draw on the equilibrium to state our 
propositions in section 3.4, I attention to the following points on sequential bids: 
• The first bid of each bidder is greater than her reservation price for the first object in all 
cases, except when the bidder’s reservation price for both objects is zero.  The extent of 
such aggressive bidding on part of a bidder is related to her reservation price levels for 
the two objects.  I will further examine this tendency to bid aggressively in section 3.4. 
• The equilibrium first bid is more involved than the second.  The solution representing the 
first bid has three components.  Under Case I, for example, the first component is simply 
the reservation price of the first object.  The second component is tied to the value boost 
from complementarity.  The third term relates to the reservation for the second object.  I 
will draw on related comparative statics in section 3.4. 
 
For a given combination of the degree of complementarity (θ) and the number of bidders 
(N+1), I will draw on Results 1 and 2 to address the bidders’ problem.  To address the seller’s 
problem, I must compare the revenues from these two results.  As Result 2 is rather messy, it is 
difficult to address the seller’s questions in closed form.  However, given the closed form 
equilibrium bids, I can infer the seller’s decision by simulating a large number of auctions for 
each combination of (θ, N+1).  I perform this analysis and present normative guidelines in the 
form of proposition in the following section.   
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3.4. Propositions from the Model 
With the model and equilibrium bids under the auction of the bundle and sequential 
auctions in place, I begin to address the study’s questions.  This section will rely on the closed 
form equilibrium bids (from section 3) to address the bidders’ questions and related simulation 
(discussed below) to address the seller’s questions. 
In our framework, the number of bidders (N+1) and the degree of complementarity (θ) 
are common knowledge at/before the start of an auction.  For each combination (N+1, θ), I 
simulated and analyzed 30,000 sets of auctions, where each set proceeds as follows.  First, from 
a uniform distribution [0, 100] where 100 (an arbitrary upper limit) represents V, I randomly 
draw the reservation prices RjA and RjB for objects A and B of each of the N+1 bidders.  The 
bundle reservation price RjAB is then (1+θ)(RjA + RjB) for each bidder j (j∈{1, …, j, … N+1}).  
The bids for objects A and B corresponds to the equilibrium bids in Results 1 and 2.  For the 
auction of the bundle AB, I identify the highest bidder as the winner and the second highest bid 
as the seller’s revenue.  For the two sequential auctions, the winner of A (or B) is the highest 
bidder of that object.  The revenue to the seller from the sequential auctions is the sum of the 
second highest bids from the two auctions.  From across the 30,000 auctions for each (N+1, θ), I 
determine the seller’s expected (i.e., mean) revenues from the auction of the bundle and from the 
sequential auctions.  Comparing them tells us which of the two formats is optimal for the seller 
for that (N+1, θ) combination.  I repeat this process for different (N+1, θ), varying N+1 in steps 
of 1 from 2 to 11 and θ from 0 to 0.8.  This analysis has been synthesized in the form of a phase 
diagram in Figure 3A, with the domains of optimality of sequential and bundled auctions clearly 
demarcated.  (I will refer to Figure 3B in a later subsection 3.4.2.)  
...……………………………..Insert Figure3 about here…...…………………………… 
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 I present the normative guidelines below in the form of five propositions.  The first three 
in section 3.4.1 below relate to the main model that assumes risk neutral bidders, and based on 
the phase diagram in Figure 3A and the earlier equilibria.  The other two propositions in section 
3.4.2 consider the impact of bidders’ risk aversion and are based on additional analysis. 
3.4.1. Guidelines on the Optimal Auction Format and Bidding Strategies 
Our first proposition examines whether and when the sequential auctions are better or 
worse for the seller than the auction of the bundle.   
Proposition 2.1: (a) Sequential auctions are optimal for the seller for weak to moderate 
complements if there are at least a few bidders (specifically, four or more).  
Auction of the bundle is optimal for strong complements only. 
 (b) The greater the number of bidders, the wider the domain of optimality of 
sequential auctions. 
Comments: The phase diagram in Figure 3 contains the exact thresholds of θ and N+1.  I treat 
complementarity as “weak” if 0 <θ ≤ 0.2, “moderate” if 0.2 <θ ≤ 0.4, and “strong” if θ > 0.4.  
(By our definition, for moderate complements, each bidder is willing to pay as much as 40% 
more than the sum of her standalone reservation prices of the objects).   
It sounds clichéd to say that a pair of complements offers the most value when a buyer 
can have them both.  Thus, “conventional wisdom” would suggest that a bundled auction would 
be the best for the seller as s/he could extract this greater value from the bidders.  Proposition 
2.1(a) clarifies that this intuition applies for strong complements only.  In an auction setting, a 
potentially counterbalancing advantage in favor of sequential auctions arises from the pool of 
bidders and is tied to its size.  With weak to moderate complements, for which the value boost is 
limited, the seller benefits from playing the bidders against each other in two competitive events.  
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The seller gains from the first auction by tapping the bidders’ desire to bid somewhat 
aggressively on object A in anticipation of also clinching object B later; the seller then gains from 
the second auction by playing off the winning bidder from the first auction against those who 
have a high value for object B alone.   
A larger bidder pool has two influences.  First, it makes the first round bidding more 
aggressive as the danger of losing the first object (and the resulting benefit of complementarity) 
is higher.  Second, as more bidders are likely to value object B highly, the first round winner has 
to maintain an aggressive stance on the second round bid.  This chain of competition boosts the 
attractiveness of sequential auctions (Proposition 2.1(b)).   
Our preliminary review of eBay suggests that a large number of auctions have bidders 
numbering in the single digits (see Hossain and Morgan 2003).  The sensitivity of Proposition 
2.1 over this range of bidders is a sign that our guidelines may be of much practical relevance.  
 Our next two propositions consider the bidders’ point of view in the context of sequential 
auctions.  (Per Result 1, the bidding decision in the bundled auction is straightforward.) 
Proposition 2.2: With sequential auctions, it is optimal to bid aggressively (i.e., more than the 
reservation price) on the first object.  The degree of aggressive bidding is 
increasing in the reservation price for object A; i.e., ( )jARbR jA −∂
∂
>0. 
Comments: The proof is in Appendix C.  The first part of the proposition is easier to see – if 
winning the first object opens up the prospect of tapping the value boost of complementarity 
later, then the bidder should justify trying harder on the first object.  The second part of the 
proposition means that the extent of aggression is climbing at an increasing rate in relation to the 
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increase in the reservation price of the first object.  A rationale is that the higher value of the first 
object is augmented by the effect of complementarity, encouraging a more aggressive first bid.   
Proposition 2.3: With sequential auctions: 
 (a) The first round winner’s second round bid is (i) greater than her reservation 
price for the second object and (ii) unrelated to the magnitude of her first 
bid and to the number of competing bidders. 
 (b) First round losers’ second round bids are equal to their respective 
reservation prices for the second object. 
Comments: The proof is in Appendix C.  The significant point from part 3 (a(i)) is that the 
aggressive bidding on the first round (i.e., bidding more than one’s reservation for the object in 
question) persists on the second round insofar as the first round winner is concerned.  This is 
driven by the danger of losing the second object, which could then negate the advantage of 
winning the first object.  Part (b) of the proposition highlights that first round losers are the ones 
who bid in the most neutral fashion for the second object.  They have lost their chance of 
benefiting from complementarity and seek only to earn a non-negative surplus from the second 
auction.  This is not to say that the bidding for the second object is tepid.  The first round winner 
must contend with the prospect of a strong bid from those with a high reservation price for the 
second object B.  Note that such a prospect is diminished when the bidders participate in a 
bundled auction in which bundling would work to decrease the heterogeneity among bidders, 
e.g., the effect of a high reservation price for object B could be neutralized by a low reservation 
price for object A. 
 Part a(ii) of the proposition formalizes an interesting result: the first round winner’s 
second round bid is  (i.e., independent of the first bid and the number of other jAjABjB RRb −=*
 53
bidders).  As RjA is the reservation price for A, the bid represents the gross increase in reservation 
price from owning the complement (i.e., the reservation price of B taken alone plus the value of 
complementarity).  That is, although the winner’s first round bid could potentially have left her 
with a negative surplus going into the second auction, she bids the most she could on the second 
object with the expectation that the second-price mechanism will win back the surplus.  
 It turns out in the equilibrium under sequential auctions that the first round winner’s 
combined total bid from the two rounds put together exceeds her reservation price for the bundle 
(i.e., ).  Recall from Result 1 in section 3 that with the auction of the bundle the 
total bid was only R
jABjBjA Rbb >+ **
jAB.  This is partly behind Proposition 1 discussed earlier. 
 I now turn to relaxing an underlying assumption of the main model.   
3.4.2. Impact of Bidders’ Risk Aversion on Optimal Decisions 
One could contend that our original assumption of risk neutrality on part of the bidders, 
which causes them to maximize expected surplus, is a driver of the somewhat aggressive bidding 
behavior in sequential auctions as outlined earlier.  That is, bidders might be willing to risk a loss 
on the first round in anticipation of an offsetting gain on the second round.   
While bidders’ risk neutrality is the typical assumption in extant articles on multi-object 
auctions (e.g., Chakraborty 2002; Krishna and Rosenthal 1996; Levine 1997), I examine the 
impact of risk aversion here given its relevance in some choice settings.  I first define a bidder to 
be maximally risk averse if she never wants to incur a negative surplus.  Examining risk aversion 
is relevant only for sequential auctions as a bidder must win the first object to have any chance of 
tapping the benefit of complementarity.  Under the bundled auction a bidder wins or loses both 
objects at her reservation price (i.e., with no risk of a negative surplus).   
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As before, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the bids for either object and is 
given in Appendix D.  Related analysis of from additional simulation (carried out as before) 
yields the phase diagram in Figure 3B. 
I now have the following proposition for the seller’s optimal strategy when faced with 
risk averse bidders.  
Proposition 2.4: In the presence of maximally risk averse bidders,  
 (a) The domain of optimality of sequential auctions shrinks relative to the risk 
neutral case.  Sequential auctions are still optimal for weak to moderate 
complements if there at least a moderate number of bidders (i.e., at least 
eight). 
 (b) The domain of optimality of sequential auctions under bidder risk aversion 
approaches that under the risk neutrality when the number of bidders is 
large. 
Comments: Refer to Figure 3(B) for proposition 2.4(a).  Part (b) is proven analytically in 
Appendix D.  While confirming the conjecture that risk aversion cuts down aggressive bidding, 
part (a) confirms that the optimality of bundled auction is not a given even in this case.  What 
still lends supports to sequential auctions is the necessity on the bidders’ part to win over two 
competitive rounds, instead of just one under the auction of the bundle.  As before, cascading 
competition under sequential auctions adds to the driving influence of reduced buyer 
heterogeneity in the bundled auction.  Part (b) makes the point that as the bidder pool is large, the 
increased effect of competition is sizable enough pushes the results closer to those under risk 
neutrality.   
 What then, is the optimal bidder strategy? 
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Proposition 2.5: Even with maximal risk aversion, 
 (a) It could be optimal for a bidder to bid more than one’s reservation price for 
the first object on the first auction. 
 (b) The bids for the second object of all bidders is identical to those under the 
risk neutral case. 
Comments: As shown in Appendix D, the equilibrium bids assuming maximal risk aversion are 
{ }VRRMaxb jABjAjA −= ,*  on the first round for all bidders j, meaning that the first bids could be 
greater than RjA.  As under the risk neutral case, jAjABjB RRb −=** , the second round bid of the 
first round winner; and  for all first round losers.  This proves the proposition.  To 
explain part (a): As each bidder is aware that the bidders’ reservation prices for object B taken 
alone fall below an upper limit V, keeping a reserve valuation of V (plus a trivial increment) from 
the first auction guarantees a win on the second auction.  Thus, bidders may bid aggressively, up 
to ( ), when the term is greater than R
iBiB Rb =*'*
VRjAB − jA, to increase their probability of winning the first 
object.  To be sure, the extent of aggressiveness is less than that under the risk neutral case (i.e., 
).   jAjAjAjA RbRb −<− ***
 I find part (b) of proposition 2.5 interesting as it underscores the robustness of the result 
under risk neutrality.  The rationale is that the second auction is indeed less risky from the 
bidders’ point of view.  After all, the first round losers do not gain from bidding more than their 
reservation prices.  The first round winner is willing to bid the entire increase in reservation price 
from owning the complement B (i.e., jAjAB RR − ), knowing fully well that she will not incur a 
loss.   
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In summary, we see that the decision to have a single (bundled) auction or sequential 
auctions for complements yields interesting and arguably counter intuitive insights. 
3.5. Two Extensions: Impact of Value Asymmetry and Substitutability 
Our main model and related analysis have focused on objects that are symmetric in their 
market level valuations (i.e., reservation prices for both are iid U[0, V]) and are either 
complements or independently valued objects.  I relax these two assumptions in this section, first 
by considering asymmetry in valuation (3.5.1) and then by examining the case of substitutes 
(3.5.2).  For the seller, asymmetry raises the important question of sequencing; i.e., which of the 
two objects should be auction first.  The challenge with substitutes is that the winner of the first 
auction might lose interest in the second object and submit a weak bid for it, diluting the benefit 
of greater competition in sequential auctions.  
3.5.1. Auctions of Asymmetrically Valued Objects 
To recount an earlier example, a Super Bowl ticket that is valued highly by the target 
market and a related souvenir that is less valuable would make up an asymmetric pair.  Bidders’ 
reservation prices for the “more valuable” object A taken alone are distributed U [0, V] while 
those for the less valuable object B are U [0, 0.5V], the difference between V and 0.5V capturing 
the market level asymmetry14.  The formulation allows stray bidders to have a higher reservation 
price for B than for A.  Bidders are risk neutral.  Other aspects of the main model remain 
unchanged.  The seller’s strategic alternatives are: (i) Auction the bundle; (ii) Auction object A 
first and then B; and (iii) Auction B first and then A.  The equilibrium bids under alternative 
strategies are derived in Appendix E.  I propose the following: 
 
                                                 
14 The case of 0.5V chosen here is a representative scenario.  The analysis and the resulting equilibrium are exactly 
the same for any kV where k in the interval (0, 1]. 
 57
Proposition 2.6: Given significant asymmetry in market level valuations for A and B: 
 (a) Sequential auctions are still optimal for the seller of weak to moderate 
complements if there are at least four bidders; auction of the bundle is 
optimal for strong complements only; 
 (b) When sequential auctions are optimal, it is best to auction the higher valued 
object first. 
Comment: The proof of the bidder’s strategy is dealt with in Appendix E while the resulting 
simulation using the optimal strategy yields the above proposition. This is shown in Figure 4. 
..….……………………………..Insert Figure 4 about here…...……………………………… 
 
Part (a) of the proposition underscores the robustness of Proposition 2.1.  Symmetry or lack 
thereof is not quite the reason why sequential auctions are appealing in the contexts they are.  
The multiple waves of competition and the resulting desire to bid aggressively, and the threat of 
losing out on the complementarity boost if the first object is not won are what favor the 
sequential auctions.  Part (b) of the proposition makes the significant point that under the domain 
of optimality of sequential auctions, the specific sequence matters to the seller.  Notice in the 
equilibrium that the first bid is positively related to the bidder’s reservation price for the first 
object and the value boost of complementarity.  As the first auction is decidedly the more 
competitive of the two auctions, putting up the higher valued object first helps in better 
extraction of the surplus.   
3.5.2. Auctions of Substitutes 
 With substitutes, the reservation price for the bundle RjAB of bidder j is less than the sum 
of her reservation prices for items A and B taken alone.  Possible substitute pairs are single 
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tickets for two successive baseball World Series games and two similar original drafts of 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg address.  The parameter θ is negative in these cases.  I identify weak 
substitutes as those with θ in the region 0>θ  ≥ -0.2.  For stronger substitutes, θ is less than -0.2, 
with the threshold θ for a pair of perfect substitutes being -0.5.15
 I assume away the possibility of arbitrage but invoke the property of free disposal.  For 
example, if a bidder has purchased the baseball tickets in the auction of the bundle, it is costless 
for her to discard one of them if she chooses to.  She might choose to do so if she has a higher 
reservation price for either game but the overdose of watching two triggers disutility from the 
bundle.  Correspondingly, I define a new valuation of the bundle ⊕
jAB
R  = Max{RjA, RjB, RjAB}.  
This incorporates the case when a single item may be preferable to a bundle.   
 I derive the pure strategy equilibria of the bids in Appendix F.  Related simulations as 
before to answer the seller’s questions yield the phase diagram in Figure 5.   
..….……………………………..Insert Figure 5 about here…...……………………………… 
Notice here that the plot for θ greater than zero is the same as in Figure 3A.  The addition here is 
the demarcation for substitutes when θ < 0.  I propose the following: 
Proposition2. 7: When the objects are substitutes: 
(a) With just two bidders, auctioning the bundle is always optimal; 
(b) With three bidders, auctioning the bundle is optimal for weak substitutes 
(i.e., with 0≥θ≥-0.2); sequential auctions are optimal for strong substitutes; 
(c) With four or more bidders, sequential auctions are always optimal. 
                                                 
15 This threshold of -0.5 is because RjA and RjB are equal for perfect substitutes, and the bundle reservation price RjAB 
equals either RjA or RjB. 
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Comments: The specific thresholds are in Figure 5.  The driver of part (a) of the proposition is 
that with two bidders, substitutability weakens the desire of the first round winner to pursue the 
second item.  Even with weak substitutes, the competition for the second item is mild and the 
odds favor the first round loser.  Interestingly, the anticipated mildness in the second round 
competition also brings down the first bid – each bidder sees an incentive in losing the first item 
to walk away with the second item.  Of course, the bidders act strategically, and the combined 
revenue to the seller from sequential auctions is weakly lower than the auction of the bundle.  On 
the other hand, in part (c), the bidder pool is large enough to trigger a fight on both rounds.  A 
win is not a given.  The benefit to the seller from these two rounds of competition is better for 
the seller than the auction of the bundle that is less appealing to the players.  Part (b) represents a 
“compromise” between the two other scenarios; so the auction of the bundle is appealing for 
weak substitutes only.   
Figure 4 is in a sense an “integrative summary” of our recommendations to the seller.  It 
contains the domains of superiority of bundled and sequential auctions for both substitutes and 
complements.  Notice in the figure that the domain of optimality of sequential auctions is 
monotonically increasing in the number of bidders (N+1) and decreasing in the degree of 
interrelatedness (θ).  That is, the combination of these factors does matter to the seller.   
 With regard to the bidders’ perspective, I turn to sequential auctions given their centrality 
for substitutes.  I find that unlike with complements, aggressive bidding on the first auction is 
not optimal with two substitutes as there is dis-synergy from owning both.  Indeed, the bidder 
tries to win the first object for less than her reservation price to hedge against the possible value 
drop from substitutability if she also wins on the second round.  Indeed, the bidder might be 
better off raising the odds of losing both objects than winning them both.  In view of these 
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factors, bidding for substitutes under risk neutrality and maximal risk aversion are closer to each 
other than they are for complements.  As before, the larger the bidder pool, the more alike are 
risk neutral and risk averse bids for the first of two substitutes.   
For the second item, the optimal bidding rule remains the same as for complements; i.e., 
the first round winner j bids R’jAB-RjA and the first losers all bid their reservation prices for the 
second object.   
3.6. Discussion 
The boom in the auction market notwithstanding, the topic of multi-object auctions 
involving complements or substitutes has received surprisingly limited attention.  The Marketing 
literature appears to have completely overlooked this important area.  I have examined this 
problem from the view point of a revenue maximizing seller who has one unit each of two 
objects to offer.  The objects are complements or substitutes of each other – such interrelatedness 
being a matter of degree and not a simple dichotomy.  The seller is faced with a known pool of 
bidders (i.e., prospective buyers).  Given this context, I have examined whether – and under what 
conditions – the seller gains by offering the objects as a bundle in a single auction or separately, 
in sequential auctions.  I also offer guidelines to the bidders on optimal bidding strategies.  While 
the conditions I establish relate primarily to the size of the bidder pool and the degree of 
interrelatedness between the two objects, I also examine the role of risk propensity of the bidders 
(risk neutral vs. risk averse) and the asymmetry in the market level valuations of the products.   
Methodologically, I consider the second price sealed bid auction format and derive the 
pure strategy Nash equilibria of the bids in the different settings.  These results suffice to address 
the bidders’ problem.  I conduct related simulations to address the questions facing the seller.  I 
see our approach and findings to be of import to practitioners and academics. 
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3.6.1. Managerial Contributions 
 The first important implication of this study for sellers and auctioneers is that auctioning 
the objects as a bundle is not a given even for complements.  Although bundling is well known 
to reduce heterogeneity in buyers’ valuations (cf. Schmalensee 1984), sequential auctions have 
the advantage (from the seller’s viewpoint) of creating a cascading (loosely, multiplicative) 
effect of competition.  This effect is increasing in the size of the bidder pool.  As a result, 
sequential auctions are the best for the seller even when the objects are moderate complements, 
so long as there are at least a few bidders (four or higher).  Of course, the auction of the bundle 
prevails for strong complements.  
 Sellers are likely to be better off recognizing the importance of auction sequence when 
the products are asymmetric in their market level valuations (e.g., Super Bowl ticket plus 
souvenir).  In general, the seller benefits from auctioning the more valuable object first.  This is 
because the tendency to bid aggressively (i.e., more than the value of the object in question) is 
greater in the first of the two auctions. 
 The message to the bidders is that there is benefit from bidding aggressively on the first 
of two complements being auctioned as losing the first means forgoing the benefit of 
complementarity.  The extent of such “aggressiveness” depends on the reservation price of the 
first object – those who value the first object more should bid more aggressively.   
3.6.2. Theoretical Contributions 
 By considering a problem at the intersection of the topic areas of auctions and bundling, 
this study contributes to both areas.  Adding to the earlier work on multi-object auctions, I have 
examined the impact of both complementarity and substitutability as well as the interactive role 
of the number of bidders.  To the best of my knowledge, this study is also the first to examine the 
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moderating role of the bidders’ risk aversion and the role of auction sequence.  Each of these 
dimensions has added new insights as noted under section 3.6.1. 
 The extant work on bundling draws strongly on second degree price discrimination.  For 
this mechanism to be potent, the objects on sale must be in fairly abundant supply, giving the 
seller the flexibility to push the objects to or hold them back from specific segments.  By 
considering two objects in limited supply I bring an added perspective.  The strategic behavior of 
the prospective buyers (i.e., bidders) is also a distinctive feature of our study. 
 Nevertheless, our paper is restrictive in several ways.  I discuss them below. 
3.6.3. Research Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 I develop a stylized model that is based on some restrictive assumptions.  I discuss the 
arising limitations of the study and propose directions for future research. 
 While I draw on precedents in the multi-object auction literature for choosing the second 
price, sealed bid format (see Chakraborty 2002 and Krishna and Rosenthal 1996), this format is 
only one of several available formats – first-price-sealed-bid and English outcry being two 
alternatives.  Examining the impact of the auction formats on the optimality of bundled vs. 
sequential auctions is likely to generate interesting insights.  
 As I consider a seller who has decided to sell off the objects, I have not considered the 
role of reserve price.  (I have in effect set it to zero.)  I speculate that the reserve price might act 
as a de facto extra bid and add to the attractiveness of sequential auctions by bringing down the 
threshold number of bidders by one.  This issue needs closer investigation. 
 Our assumption that the bidders’ reservation prices are independent private value is 
arguably at odds with some industrial markets such as FCC auctions of wireless licenses and 
international bidding/leasing of oil fields.  It may be more reasonable to assume that the objects 
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have common value (as examined in Benoit and Krishna 2001).  I urge future work relaxing our 
assumption of private value but retaining the other dimensions of our model such as the role of 
risk propensity and substitutability.  I surmise that the motivation to bid aggressively might be 
blunted in the new setting as there is less surprise on what would constitute a winning bid.   
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4. CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE WORK 
In this work, I look at competitive consumer price formation in two different auction 
settings. I look at how bidder strategies vary according to the specific auction mechanism 
adopted and the role of increased competition. Thus, we have the competition between 
consumers shaping the final price. In both essays, I look at the auctioneer who has to choose 
between different auction formats given rational consumer behavior. Thus in essay 1, the 
consumer’s optimal bidding strategy across the eBay and Yahoo! auction formats drives the 
implications for the final price realized for the seller. This influences the seller’s strategy 
regarding the particular auction format adopted. In essay 2, I derive the optimal bidding strategy 
for the consumer in two different settings – when the objects are auctioned as a bundle and when 
the objects are offered in sequence. I then derive the optimal bidding strategy and use this 
strategy to derive implications for the seller. 
4.1. Key Contributions 
 In this section, I identify key theoretical contributions to the literature on auctions 
that follow from the two essays. First, this work adds to the theoretical work on last minute 
bidding in online auctions (Wilcox 2000, Roth and Ockenfels 2002) by examining the issue with 
respect to the specific format adopted. I find that the effect of last minute bidding is stronger 
(lower revenue) with the Yahoo! format than with eBay. This is because bid levels reach the 
final valuation faster with the eBay format than with the Yahoo! format. Second, we see the 
impact of proxy bidding in the English outcry auction format. As discussed earlier, the use of 
proxy bidding by all bidders would make the Yahoo! format identical to eBay. Thus, introducing 
the facility of proxy bidding makes the Yahoo! format more attractive for the seller. On the other 
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hand for the bidders, this facility also brings convenience so that she saves the hassle of being 
present at the very last moment to place a bid. 
The second essay extends the multi-object auction literature to dissimilar objects. The 
literature on multi-object auctions has till now restricted itself to either dissimilar but 
independent objects (e.g., Chakraborty 2001) or identical objects (e.g., Krishna and Rosenthal 
1996). I model the relationship between the objects as a continuum ranging from strong 
complements to strong substitutes. I also allow the objects to be distinct and asymmetric. By 
considering substitutes and complements, we can see from proposition 7 in essay 2 that a unified 
picture regarding optimality of bundling/unbundling emerges from the analysis. In addition, I 
also look at the role of risk aversion in sequential auctions to get the rather surprising 
convergence of risk neutral and maximally risk averse bidding strategies in sequential auctions. 
4.2. Methodology Adopted 
In both essays, I use game theoretic methods to identify optimal actions for the players 
involved. This is relevant given the nature of competition and the opposing competitive forces 
involved. Indeed, use of game theory is fairly widespread in the analysis of auctions (e.g., Sinha 
and Greenleaf 2000, Greenleaf, Rao and Sinha 1993, Lynch and Ariely 2001).While the second 
essay is primarily theoretical, I test the propositions in the first essay using online data collected 
over the internet.  
In essay 1, I estimate a system of linear models where the parameters are identified 
simultaneously. This is important as we have matched samples of objects that were sold at the 
same time over the internet using different formats. While the two formats considered (English 
outcry and hybrid) differ in terms of the bidding rules, I control for a number of factors that 
influence the final price realized in both. In spite of the difference in formats, we see that except 
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two (jump bidding in Yahoo and common value dummy in eBay), the remaining factors are the 
same. This similarity in the nature of variables involved and the objects sold makes simultaneous 
estimation attractive. Another advantage of this methodology is that we can see the effects of 
controlling for various factors in isolation. This also allows us to look at the incremental impact 
of the presence of common value in the final price realized.  
In Essay 2, I look at the choices of the seller and the consumer as outcomes of a 
sequential game. Here, the seller acts first followed by the consumer. Specifically, the bidders 
decide their strategy after the auctioneer decides on the auction method (bundled vs. sequential 
auction). As is customary in sequential games, I solve the game by backward induction so that 
the bidders’ problem is solved first and this in turn is used to identify the optimal strategy for the 
seller. In both essays, the consumers are strategic and forward looking.  
4.3. Implications for the Marketer  
4.3.1. Implications of Essay1  
In this section, I identify four specific implications for sellers using online auctions. First, 
the seller should appreciate the important difference between the traditional English outcry 
auction format and the hybrid format used by eBay. This is because, as we see from proposition 
3; the hybrid auction format permits a speedier convergence to the final price. This in turn 
implies that fewer bids would be required to reach a given price level than with the English 
outcry format.  
Second, the nature of the object sold is of crucial importance given the auction 
mechanism adopted. If the seller knows that the object sold is likely to have interdependent 
valuation, he can anticipate greater instances of last minute bidding in both auction formats. 
Also, the presence of interdependent valuations would imply greater possible revenue from the 
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hybrid format when compared to the English outcry format. It should be noted that a priori 
inference of the presence and extent of interdependence in valuations across bidders for the 
product is not simple. Essay 1 offers preliminary guidelines for a seller to infer the presence of 
common valuation for the object (ex post) among the bidders by simply scanning the bid history 
for multiple bids in the hybrid auction format. The conclusion however is indicative of the 
presence of a common value component but not of the extent of interdependency in valuations.  
Third, for experience goods, the eBay mechanism could reveal how the consumers 
assimilate information in the marketplace to develop their reservation prices for the product. 
Hoffman et. al (1993) look at price formation in an auction setting for packaged beef where they 
consider the fifth price auction (where the highest bidder gets than object at the fifth highest 
price), with a focus on the final valuation of the consumer. They further develop the sealed bid 
auction as a pretest tool to aid the marketer’s decisions. My study on the other hand, could yield 
insights as to how the consumer arrives at her final reservation price and specifically, how 
valuable is the information. Another possibility is to modify the format as a multi-round 
mechanism where except the first round, the remaining rounds are probabilistic. This could yield 
insights as to the proportion and demographic characteristics of consumers who are unsure of the 
product (due to lack of experience with it) and use the bids of others as a proxy for experience to 
arrive at a valuation.  
Finally, this study gives an additional (but not competing) explanation for the success of 
eBay. My results indicate that given the format, it is an attractive choice for the seller and thus, it 
is likely that sellers would be more attracted to eBay rather than Yahoo! This supply generates its 
own demand resulting in higher overall popularity. At the extreme, this might result in 
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oversupply in eBay bringing down the number of bidders16. This also implies that although the 
eBay format itself is likely top generate higher revenue, buyers may not be as eager to purchase 
from eBay. Thus, the earlier conclusions regarding higher revenue from the eBay format has to 
be tempered by the possibility of lower demand. 
4.3.2. Implications of Essay 2 
In essay 2, the implications for the marketer/seller follow directly from the propositions 
developed in the model. First, with complements, we see that sequential auctions become more 
attractive with increased bidders. The reason is that due to the sequential nature of bids placed 
and objects sold, the heterogeneity of bids in sequential auctions (as discussed in Chapter 3) 
becomes strong enough to push revenue upwards. In the case of bundled auctions, heterogeneity 
actually reduces because of bundling. Thus, the auctioneer’s decision to bundle or unbundle his 
offering depends both on the number of bidders and their risk preference. Thus, the auctioneer 
cannot infer greater revenue from bundling simply because of the complementary nature of the 
items sold. Specifically, bundling is always optimal for strong complements only.  
In a similar vein, I show that unbundling substitutes is also not always optimal. 
Specifically, if the number of bidders is less than four, the seller may be better off bundling the 
offer. In our setting, this would imply that if the seller anticipates fewer bidders for both objects, 
he should seriously consider bundling the offer. On the other hand, if the number of bidders is 
greater than 4, unbundling is unambiguously better than bundling for substitutes. Finally, as per 
proposition 6 in essay 2, when the auctioneer has asymmetric objects to sell; he should sell the 
more valuable object first.  
                                                 
16 It is possible that this is already the case to some extent as on June 22nd 2005, Mangalindan notes in the Wall 
Street Journal that increasingly sellers are finding it difficult to get good buyer pools in eBay. 
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4.4. Implications for the Consumer 
4.4.1. Implications of Essay 1 
Looking at the results of essay 1, I can identify three implications for the internet savvy 
consumer of today. First, although Wilcox (2000) and Roth and Ockenfels (2002) discuss at 
length the motivation behind last minute bidding and its advantages, the consumer should know 
the nature of its impact on the final price realized and how it varies with auction forms. Essay 1 
argues and reveals that last minute bidding is likely to have greater impact in the case of Yahoo! 
than with eBay. Although this supports the existing view regarding the advantages of last minute 
bidding, we can see that the potential benefit of bidding at the last minute is greater with Yahoo! 
than with eBay. 
Next, it would be useful for consumers to understand the role of proxy bidding in Yahoo! 
This rule creates flexibility for consumers so that the auction website bids incrementally on their 
behalf. I argue that proxy bidding actually brings the Yahoo! format closer to eBay. In addition 
to flexibility, this rule reduces the hassle for the consumer (by avoiding late and multiple bids) 
but also implies a greater chance of paying a higher final price. It is for the consumer to tradeoff 
the benefits of proxy bidding with the benefits and risks17 of last minute bidding.   
Third, essay 1 argues that the presence or absence of a common value component in 
online auctions could be context driven rather than product driven. For instance, a computer 
engineer would make a more accurate assessment of the value of a computer by looking at its 
specifications than a consumer unfamiliar with computer terminology. This means that bids 
reveal different levels of information to different kinds of bidders. Therefore, it becomes more 
important for the uninformed bidders to scan the bid history before placing their bids at the last 
moment. 
                                                 
17 The main risk with last minute bidding is that the final bid may not be registered.  
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4.4.2. Implications of Essay 2 
In essay 2, I identify three key implications that follow from the analysis. First, for 
sequentially sold complements, a risk neutral bidder is always better off by bidding higher than 
her willingness to pay for the first object. The risk of a possible loss is traded off by the 
possibility of synergy gains (if both objects are won) and the reduced intensity of competition for 
the second object after the first object is won. This results in the equilibrium bid for 
complements that drives the implications for the auctioneer.  
Second, bidder strategy changes with increasing number of bidders. Specifically, with 
more bidders, there is a greater risk of losing the second object after the first object is won. With 
more bidders, the possibility of losing the second object after overbidding in the first round 
(resulting in a net loss) increases. At the limit, this risk of possible loss increases to such an 
extent, that risk neutral bidding converges to maximally risk averse bidding18 as the number of 
bidders goes to infinity. Similarly in the case of substitutes, risk neutral bidding involves 
underbidding (bidding below the willingness to pay) for the first item. Again with very similar 
reasoning, increasing number of bidders also implies a convergence of maximally risk averse and 
risk neutral bidding. In the case of substitutes however, maximal risk aversion implies bidding 
the willingness to pay for the first item.  
Paradoxically, my recommendation of aggressive bidding for the first object goes 
together with the usefulness of maximal risk aversion as a viable strategy. As I show in chapter 
three, maximally risk averse bidding also (weakly) permits bids above the willingness to pay for 
the objects. As seen earlier, the risk of making a loss is a restraining effect on the extent of 
overbidding by the risk neutral bidders. This risk increases with the number of bidders so that in 
the limit, risk neutral bid levels approach the bid levels with maximal risk aversion. 
                                                 
18 As defined in essay 2, a maximally risk averse bidder is one who bids so that she never makes a loss. 
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Third, we see a phenomenon in an independent private value framework where bidders 
are confronted with the possibility of a loss with a second price sealed bid auction format. This is 
interesting as to the best of my knowledge, second price sealed bid auctions never expose the 
bidders to a risk of a loss in an independent private value framework. For instance, in a 
traditional single object auction, the bidder knows that she would pay less than her bid amount 
and thus can confidently bid her willingness to pay without risking a loss.  In our case, the 
possibility of a loss arises as the bidder faces uncertainty about the realization of 
complementarity gains as it is possible that she loses the second auction after winning then first. 
This effect is different from the winner’s curse (c.f., Kagel and Levin 1986 and Thaler 1988) 
where the possibility of loss arises due to the bidder’s uncertainty regarding her valuation 
whereas in our setting, there is no such uncertainty. 
4.5. Limitations and Areas for Future Work 
In this section, I discuss the limitations of the research setting and the analysis of this 
work and thus simultaneously identify potential areas for future work. With respect to model 
assumptions, I use game theory in both essays to derive implications for both the marketer and 
the consumer thereby imposing perfect rationality and surplus maximizing behavior for all 
players involved. While I do consider risk aversion in essay 2 explicitly, real world consumers 
would not only be risk averse but also be heterogeneous with respect to their attitudes towards 
risk. Moreover, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) implies that consumers do not 
always maximize a risk averse utility function.  
While incorporating prospect theory and/or risk aversion would be an improvement, the 
task is far from easy. For example, in a game theoretic setting, it is easy to model consumer 
surplus maximization as perfectly rational behavior and derive optimal strategies. Relaxing this 
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allows infinite possibilities of behavior that is rational for the individual consumer but 
suboptimal from the researcher’s point of view. One way to get around this could be to impose a 
distribution along the continuum of utility functions that attach varying weightage to the risk 
preferences or to the way consumers attach importance to the probabilities of success. I the 
context of the first essay, it may be possible to incorporate a concave utility function for the 
consumer and identify segments of consumers who exhibit different patterns of risk aversion and 
relate it to the extent of common value in the item sold. One way to do this could be a latent class 
analysis similar to Kamakura and Russell (1989). I think that these would be interesting areas for 
future work. 
In both essays, the analysis assumes perfect information among bidders regarding certain 
object and auction characteristics. In essay 1, it is assumed that the number of bidders and the 
valuation functions are commonly known. Similarly in essay 2, the number of bidders, the 
distribution of valuations and the extent of complementarity are all common knowledge. While 
this assumption is common in the action literature (e.g. Milgrom and Weber 1982, Avery 1998, 
Levin and Smith 1996), relaxing it would certainly bring the analysis closer to the real world.  
In an online marketplace where the seller can access the consumer without resorting to 
middlemen, I examine two specific contexts involving auctions. Indeed, auctions have grown in 
popularity in the recent years but this is largely attributable to the C2C market where consumers 
lacking the organization to sell their wares find auctions to be a great resource. While we do have 
implications for the marketer in terms of the kind of auction format to choose (in essay 1) and the 
optimal strategy regarding the bundling/unbundling problem (essay 2), I do not tackle the higher 
level question as to when should a marketer use auctions as a selling medium. Given a product, 
is it better to use direct sales to reach the consumer or is it better to use auctions to attract 
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customers? There are merits for either approach. As noted in essay 2, auctions would allow 
strong price discrimination. However, if the auctioneer has many units to sell, theory has shown 
(e.g., Lynch and Ariely 2001) that the use of simultaneous auctions may result in a drop in price 
realized in later rounds before market clearance. This is referred to as the “free rider problem” 
where bidders strategically bid low in the early rounds as they anticipate lesser competition in 
the later rounds due to partial satiation of demand. Similarly, we have arguments going either 
way for and against direct sales. I think that this would be an important question to be tackled in 
later work. 
4.6. Conclusions 
In Summary, I feel that auctions offer great opportunities for research in marketing. 
Particularly, online auctions have great potential for research in the context where the seller and 
the consumer are human beings as opposed to businesses. In spite of a large body of existing 
work on auctions, I feel that research in auctions, particularly the C2C setting is relatively under 
researched. Given the emphasis on game theoretic modeling and consumer behavior, marketing 
scholars are in a great position to exploit the current popularity of online auctions to develop 
research streams where online consumers (as opposed to firms) are the decision makers. This 
work is a step in this direction and I expect further exciting research in this area. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.1 
 
Proposition 1.1: The expected revenue from the hybrid auction format is at least as great as that 
of the English outcry format with re-entry. 
 
Proof: 
Consider the situation where there are N bidders in both auctions. We first define the following 
notation. 
 
Time duration for both auctions : T 
Number of bidders   : N 
Signal received by bidder i∈{1…N} : xi
Complete Vector of Signals  : X={xi} 
Expected Valuation of each bidder : ui=u(xi,x-i) 
Additionally, ji
x
u
x
u
j
i
i
i ≠≥∂
∂>∂
∂ ,0  
 
Thus, the object for auction is of common value. I also assume as in Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
that the signals are strictly affiliated. 
Let x1>x2>……>xN without loss of generality. 
I assume that the signals are drawn from an everywhere continuous pdf f(.) defined over an 
interval with finite support and this is common knowledge as well. 
I assume that the bidders are risk neutral. 
First, I state three important results from Milgrom and Weber(1982) that would be used later. 
Result A: The expected revenue from the second price sealed bid auction is at least as great as 
the revenue from the first price sealed bid auction when both auction formats have the same 
reserve price. In particular, the above relation holds when the reserve price is zero. 
Result B: In the second price sealed bid auction with common values, the symmetric equilibrium 
bid strategy is as follows: 
 
bm*=V(xm, xm)      (A1) 
where 
 
V(x,y)=Expected Valuation of  the bidder where x is the highest signal and y is the next highest 
signal. Thus, the bid function above implies that the dominant strategy for bidder m is to bid 
assuming that his/her signal is the highest and the next highest signal is tied to his/her signal. I 
use this result as the benchmark since the problem of bidding in the hybrid auction format is 
similar to that of bidding in a second price sealed bid auction with multiple rounds. If the 
remaining signals X2…XN are ordered as Y1>Y2>..YN-1, the above expression  implies: 
 
V(xm, xm)=E[u(X1,Y1,Y2….YN-1)│X1=xm,Y1=xm]  (A2) 
In the above and in the following discussion, upper case denotes the random variable and the 
lower case denotes the actual realization of the random variable. 
 80
In the expression A2, yi is the ith order statistic of the remaining signals where the first order 
statistic among the N-1 signals is constrained to be equal to the signal of bidder m. 
 
Result C: The symmetric equilibrium strategy in the English outcry auction is given by the 
threshold level 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= +
−
Nk
timesk
iii xxxxu ,...,,... 1321β      (A3) 
up to which the bidder bids when N-k bidders have dropped out. Intuitively, this means that 
bidder i substitutes his/her own signal for all the bidders while constructing his/her expected 
valuation and once a bidder drops out, bidder i inverts the bid function to infer the signal of the 
bidder who dropped and updates the threshold to which the bidder will bid. Thus, the bidder i 
begins with and updates his/her threshold bid level as given by (A3) after N-k 
bidders have dropped out. Thus, if bidder 2 has the second highest signal, s/he would bid up to 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−
321
timesN
iii xxu ,...β
( Nxxxxu ,..,, 3222 = )β  and drop out immediately after this as bidder 2 would infer the values of 
the signals x3…xN when the other bidders drop out. 
 
Case 1: Consider the situation where all the bidders bid at the last moment. This is the optimal 
strategy in common valued online auctions with a predetermined duration following 
Wilcox(2000). In this case, the hybrid auction and the English Outcry auction reduce to the 
second price sealed bid and the first price sealed bid auctions respectively. Using result A, the 
expected revenue from the second price sealed bid auction is at least as great as that of the first 
price sealed bid auction. Hence the result of the proposition follows. 
Case 2: Consider the situation where 2 bidders deviate from the policy of last minute bidding and 
bid earlier. I assume that the bidders do not bid at the last minute only if they think that they will 
not be available at that time in the auction. Denoting these bidders by i and j, I assume without 
loss of generality that xi>xj. In the English outcry auction, these bidders compete as in a regular 
English outcry auction so that bidder j drops out when his/her expected valuation is reached. 
Bidder j’s expected valuation here is simply u(xj,xj) as given by equation (A3). On the other 
hand, bidder i only bids marginally above bidder j’s valuation. Thus, for the remaining bidders, 
the signal xj is known by inverting the valuation function for bidder j. The bidders also know that 
xi>xj as i is the highest bidder.  
 
Denote xi’=E[xi|xi>xj]       (A4) 
 
In the hybrid auction, the bidders i and j bid as in the second price sealed bid auction. This is 
because the deviating bidders feel that they will not be available at the last moment and they 
know that the winning bidder pays the second highest bid. Thus from result B, bidder j bids 
V(xj,xj)= E[u(x1,y1)│x1=xj,y1=xj]= u(xj,xj) and bidder i bids V(xi,xi)= u(xi,xi) and since xi>xj; 
V(xj,xj)< V(xi,xi). Since the second highest bid is posted, V(xj,xj) is now known. This enables 
other bidders to invert the bid function and infer xj. Also, the other bidders know that xi>xj (as 
the highest bidder’s identity is also posted). Thus, the other bidders can make an assessment of xi 
as E[xi|xi>xj]=xi’ as in the English outcry auction. 
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Now consider the bidding at the last moment by all the bidders. In both auctions, a typical bidder 
k knows the following set of signals {xk, xj, xi’, E[xn] where n≠j,i,k}. At the last minute therefore 
the bidding problem faced by the two sets of bidders is identical. However, in the English outcry 
auction with re-entry, the situation is that of a first price sealed bid auction and in the hybrid 
auction, the situation is the same as that of a second price sealed bid auction. From result A, we 
know that the revenue realized in this situation is greater in the second price sealed bid auction 
and hence the result follows. We also note that when the two bidders (j and i) bid earlier in the 
English outcry auction, bidder j (and consequently bidder i) would never bid above 
u(xj,xj)=V(xj,xj) which is the bid placed by bidder j in the hybrid auction. Thus, the outstanding 
reserve price in the hybrid auction is the same as that in the English outcry auction and result A 
holds as the bidders in the hybrid auction bid as if they are in the second price sealed bid auction 
and the bidders in the English outcry auction bid as in the first price sealed bid auction. 
 
The above reasoning is intact when the number of deviating bidders is more than 2. For example, 
consider 3 bidders i,j and k and xi>xj>xk. When they bid before the last minute in the English 
outcry auction, bidder k drops out after his/her valuation is reached. Then bidders j and i 
continue bidding till j drops out after his/her valuation is reached. Thus the other bidders can 
infer xk, xj and E[xi|xi>xj]=xi’. In the hybrid auction, bidders i,j and k 0bid V(xi,xi), V(xj,xj) and 
V(xk,xk) respectively. Since xi>xj>xk by construction, V(xi,xi)>V(xj,xj)>V(xk,xk). Since the 
highest bid is not revealed, the bidders infer xk, xj and E[xi|xi>xj]=xi’. Thus at the final minute a 
typical bidder r has the following set of signals {xk, xj, xr,xi’, E[xn] where n≠j,i,k,r}. This is also 
exactly the same set of signals available to any bidder r in the English outcry auction. Now at the 
last minute, the bidders in the English outcry auction compete (as earlier) in a first price sealed 
bid auction and the bidders in the hybrid auction compete in a second price sealed bid auction. 
Since the bidders again have the same set of signals and the same outstanding price to beat, from 
result A we again see that the expected revenue from the hybrid auction is greater than that of the 
English outcry auction. I note that the outstanding price before then last minute is the same 
because of the following argument. 
From result C and equation A3, we know that when bidder k drops out, bidder j bids up to 
u(xj,xj,xk) in the English outcry auction. In the hybrid auction, after inferring xk, bidder j bids 
V(xj,xj)=E(u(X1,Y1)│X1=xj,Y1=xj,Xk=xk))= u(xj,xj,xk) 
 
The above reasoning holds regardless of the sequence of bidding in the hybrid auction. I consider 
the possible cases below. 
 
 Case 2a: Bidder i bids first followed by bidder j and then bidder k in both auctions. Then 
s/he bids V(xi,xi). Since the highest bid is not known, the next bidder (say bidder j) bids V(xj,xj). 
Since V(xj,xj)< V(xi,xi), V(xj,xj) is observed and bidder k infers xj. Now V(xk,xk)= 
E(u(X1,Y1)│X1=xk,Y1=xk,Xj=xk))<V(xj,xj) (in the preceding inequality, Xj is constrained to be xk 
as Xj is always less than X1) and thus s/he does not bid. In the English outcry auction also bidder 
j drops out after his/her valuation is reached. As xj>xk, valuation of bidder k is less than that of 
bidder j and s/he does not enter any bid and the situation is the same as the case where two 
bidders deviate and the proposition follows.  
 Case 2b: Bidder i bids first followed by bidder k and then bidder j in both auctions. Now, 
both signals xk and xj would be revealed as k would bid V(xk,xk)<V(xj,xj) and consequently 
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bidder j also bids and since V(xj,xj)< V(xi,xi)=bid placed by i, both signals k and j are revealed 
leading us to case 2 discussed earlier. 
 Case 2c: Bidder j goes first. Now, if bidder i goes next in both auctions, k does not bid in 
both auctions as valuation of j is greater than the valuation of k. Thus, the only signal revealed in 
both auctions is xj and the bidders assess xi’= E[xi|xi>xj] and the situation is the same for both 
acutions in the last minute as discussed in case 2. If bidder k goes first in both auctions, since 
V(xi,xi)>V(xj,xj)>V(xk,xk), in the hybrid auction, k’s bid is lower than j’s bid and thus, his/her 
bid is known leading to bidders inferring xk. Again since xi is the highest signal among the three 
bidders, his/her bid is unseen and consequently V(xj,xj) is revealed leading to bidders inferring xj 
(and xk due to earlier bids). Similarly the situation is the same in the English outcry auction as 
bidders j and k bid first leading to k dropping out after his/her valuation is reached. Then, after i 
enters, j drops out after his/her valuation is reached leading to signals xj and xk being revealed 
and the situation is the same as in case 2. 
 Case 2d: Bidder k goes first. Now if bidder i goes next in the hybrid auction, s/he bids 
V(xi,xi)> V(xk,xk). Therefore the bid V(xk,xk) is revealed since only the second highest bid is 
known. Now when bidder j bids V(xj,xj), since V(xi,xi)>V(xj,xj)>V(xk,xk), j’s bid is the second 
highest and thus the bidders now infer xk, xj and xi’. Similarly in the English outcry auction, 
when bidders i and k bid, k drops out after his/her valuation is reached and bidder j enters and 
drops out after his/her valuation is reached. Thus the bidders infer xk, xj and xi’ and the situation 
is the same as in case 2. The situation is again the same if bidder j follows bidder k before bidder 
i. Only the order of revelation of signals changes in both auctions (xk followed by xj followed by 
xi’) in both the auctions and we are back to case 2.  
 
Case 3: Only one bidder deviates from the strategy of last minute bidding 
 
The above logic continues to hold as the deviating bidder (say bidder xj) has an incentive to beat 
the reserve price only in the English outcry auction. In the hybrid auction, the highest bid is not 
known. Thus, the remaining bidders make identical inferences regarding signal xj (the bidders 
infer E[xj|xj>xk where V(xk)=R= Reserve price) in both auction forms. 
 
Case 4: This is the case where the two highest signals happen to belong to the deviators who do 
not bid at the last moment. In this case, there is no bidding at the last minute as other bidders 
cannot beat the outstanding bid. As we have seen earlier, the outstanding price formed in this 
situation is identical for both the auction formats. Thus, in this particular case, the revenue 
realized from both auction formats is the same.  
 
Thus, combining the above four cases, we see that the revenue realized from the Hybrid auction 
format is never less than that of the English outcry format with re-entry. 
 
Remark: Case 4 shows that when there is no last minute bidding, the revenue from both formats 
is the same and otherwise the revenue is likely to be greater for the hybrid format. This result is 
in the same direction as Proposition 4.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Model 2 in Essay 1 
 
First I introduce some notation 
 
Total time duration for each auction :    T 
Final price realized:       P 
Bid placed at time tε[0,T]:      bt
Reserve Price:        R 
First bid:        b0
Time of first bid:       t0
 
I now normalize as follows: 
 
Effective auction duration:      T-t0
For any bid bt, the price is taken to be (bt-R)/(P-R) 
Corresponding time is taken to be (t-t0)/(T-t0). Also, when t=T, bT=P 
Thus, we can see that  
EPriceε[0,1] 
YPriceε[0,1] 
Tε[0,1] 
 
For model 3a, 
Total time duration for each auction :    T 
Bid at time T=final bid       bT 
Final price realized:       P 
Bid placed at time tε[0,T]:      bt 
Price at that point       bt/bT 
Thus, outstanding price when 80% of the auction is over   b0.8 
Bid placed at time t with t>0.8     bt
Effective duration       T-0.8T 
Normalized time (t’)       (t-0.8T)/(T-0.8T) 
Effective price increase      bt-b0.8 
Effective increase as a fraction of total increase   
( )
( )T
t
T bb
bb
b /1
1
8.0
8.0'
−
−
 
Thus,  
EPriceε[0,1] 
YPriceε[0,1] 
Tε[0,1] 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Main Model: Proofs of Equilibrium Bids for Complements and for Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 
 
It follows directly from Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Vickrey (1961) that the optimal bid in 
the auction of a bundle of complements is the reservation price for the bundle.  This appendix 
will focus on the equilibrium bids under the sequential auctions and related Propositions 2.2 and 
2.3.   
 
Without loss of generality, I derive the equilibrium bids from the standpoint of bidder j.  For the 
first auction (of object A), each of the remaining N bidders is identified by the tag i such that 
Max{biA} represents the highest of these N bids.  If j is the first round winner, the tags i of the 
other bidders remain unchanged.  However, if bidder j is a first round loser, then one of the other 
N bidders must have won object A.  In that case, for the second auction (of object B), the first 
round winner alone is identified as bidder k, and each of the other N-1 bidders (excluding bidder 
j) will continue to be identified as bidders i.  This clear identification of the first round winner is 
necessary as her second round bid is qualitatively different from those of the first round losers.   
 
Now to restate equation (6), the bidder maximizes her expected surplus given by  
 
Surplus= 
{ } { }
{ }
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   (C-1) 
 
In the above, the prime (’) symbol as in iBb′  represents the bid of a first round loser.  Also, in 
each term on the right hand side, P(.) represents the probability of the event of, say, bidder j’s 
first bid exceeding those of all other bidders. 
I solve by backward induction.  So I start with the equilibrium bids for the second object B.  
Equilibrium Bid for the Second Object B: 
Two cases matter: (a) When bidder j is the first round winner and (b) j is a first round loser. 
Under case (a), to show that bjB=RjAB-RjA is the equilibrium bid for object B: 
Suppose j has won the first object at a price p (i.e., the second highest bid for object A was p). 
Bidder j’s surplus from winning the first object is s=RjA-p.  When bidding for the second object, j 
tries to improve upon this surplus.  Accordingly, while bidding for B, she ensures that her total 
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payout contingent on winning both items across the two auctions would not exceed RjAB-s; i.e., 
not greater than RjAB-(RjA-p) = RjAB-RjA+p.  Having already paid p on winning object A, j’s 
maximum willingness to pay for object B is RjAB-RjA.  Given that the auction of B is also of the 
second price sealed bid type, bidder j gains most by bidding the willingness to pay RjAB-RjA..  
Q.E.D. 
Under case (b), when j is a first round loser, to show that  =R
jB
b′ jB is the equilibrium bid for B. 
As bidder j’s reservation price for B is RjB (i.e., no benefit of complementarity having lost the 
first auction), it is weakly dominant to bid one’s valuation (cf. Milgrom & Weber 1982). 
 
Equilibrium Bid for the First Object A: 
The earlier equilibrium bids for object B are independent of the price at which the first object is 
won.  This reduces the optimization problem in equation (C-1) to that of maximization over only 
one variable bjA as there are weakly dominant bids for B that are independent of the price at 
which object A is won (or lost).  
I will now begin to restate equation (C-1) by identifying the specific values of the various 
probabilities P(.) and the expected values E(.). 
On : I assume that the maximum bid (i.e., the first order statistic of the 
distribution of first bids) for A follows the cdf G(.) that is everywhere differentiable.  Its pdf is 
g(.).  Therefore,  is G(b
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ <≠ jAjiiA bb }Max{P
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⎛ <≠ jAjiiA bb }Max{P jA) and  is (1- G(b⎟⎠
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⎛ >≠ jAjiiA bb }Max{P jA)). 
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⎞⎜⎝
⎛ <≠ jBjiiB bb }'Max{P iBb′ iB, the cdf of  is jiiBR ≠}Max{ ( )
N
V
xxF ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= , the first 
order statistic of N realizations of RiB that are uniformly distributed. Thus,  
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)(    when 1
)(0  when 
 )}'P(Max{  
 
On : Denoting random variable 
by z with associated cdf H(.) and pdf h(.), P(.) is H(R
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ <≠ jBkBkjiiB bbb },,}'Max{Max{P
},}'Max{Max{
, kBkjiiB
bb ≠ jB) as RjB is j’s 
winning bid for B conditional on losing the first auction.   
Recasting equation (A-1) for the surplus maximizing bidder, we have the objective function: 
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For simplicity, let this be: Maximize {I + II + III} 
We must consider two cases.  Case (i) is when (RjAB-RjA)≤V: As RjAB-RjA is j’s bid for B 
conditional on j being the first round winner, (RjAB-RjA)≤V means j’s probability of winning the B 
is below 100%.  Case (ii) is when (RjAB-RjA)>V: As V is the maximum possible bid of the first 
round losers, j is certain of winning object B with this bid.   
I begin by considering Case (i). 
Notice that ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫∫ −==
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0 0
0
0
=  and G(0)=0. ( )∫−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
jAb
jAjA
dttGbGb
0
Using this relationship, simplifying term I through integration by parts and canceling like terms, 
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Similarly, with term II: 
 ( )( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−=∂
∂ NjAjAB
jAjAjA
jA V
RR
bRbgII
b
1)(                                                      (C-3) 
With term III: (Recall that = z with associated cdf H(.) and pdf h(.).) },}'Max{Max{
, iBijkkB
bb ≠
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Now, to evaluate  , we must first state and prove the following lemma. ∫
jBR
dttH
0
)(
Lemma: z is distributed as follows in the interval [0, V]:  ⎟⎠
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[Now although z can have a maximum value of (1+2θ)V, I limit the lemma for the range where 
z≤V as V is the upper bound of RjB.  This is the relevant range over which j has any chance of 
winning the second object having lost the first object.]   
Proof of the Lemma: 
From the equilibria of second round bids derived earlier, when bidder k is the first round winner, 
b’iB (= RiB) represents the second round bids of the N-1 first round losers (excluding j).  The 
distribution of Max{RiB} ∀ k≠i,j is the first order statistic w (i.e., the maximum of the N-1 bids) 
of RiB. Then its cdf T(w) is given by: ( ) Vw
V
w
wT
N
≤≤
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= 0;
1
.  Further, bkB=RkAB-RkA. 
To rewrite,  RkAB-RkA=(1+θ)(RkA+RkB) –RkA=(1+θ)RkB+θRkA                          (C-5) 
As RkA, RkB are iid U [0, V], (1+θ)RkB is distributed U [0, (1+θ)V] and θRkA is distributed U [0, 
θV]. Thus, the distribution of the random variable X = (1+θ)RkB+θRkA has pdf f(x) as graphed 
below (with the shaded region denoting the relevant range RjB which j has a possible chance of 
beating k): 
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In the graph, the pdf of x in [0, V] is: 
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This proves the lemma.  We can now evaluate III and its partial derivative in equation (C-4). 
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F.O.C.: Setting 0)( =++∂
∂
IIIIII
b jA
 and solving for j’s optimal first bid  given *jAb
( )θ,, jBjA RR , we get that when (RjAB-RjA)≤V: 
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Notice that I reject g(bjA)=0 as a solution as this would imply an arbitrary first bid that is 
independent of j’s reservation prices.  The solution in equation (C-8) also satisfies the second 
 89
order condition 0)(
2
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∂
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jA
 confirming that it is bidder j’s surplus maximizing first 
bid.   
Now I turn to case (ii); i.e., when VRR jAjAB >− )( .  If bidder j’s is the first round winner, her 
equilibrium bid of  (>V) for object B will certainly win her B as competing 
bids are bounded in [0, V].  Therefore, in equation (A-1), =1.  Using this 
and simplifying the maximization problem as with case (i) before, we get: 
jAjABjB
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(C-9) 
Since I have already proved the optimality of bids b’jB and bjB, the equilibrium from the bidder’s 
side in the sequential auctions is proved. 
The equilibria are unique and symmetric.  That is, they hold for each bidder and do not depend 
on the reservation prices of the other bidders.  To appreciate the uniqueness, consider a case 
when the “other” bidders deviate in a systematic manner (tied to their valuations) so that the cdf 
of the first order statistic of the first bid is again differentiable everywhere. Then in the 
maximization problem, the term containing the pdf of the maximum first bid drops out, yielding 
the same equilibria confirming uniqueness.  
Proof of Proposition 2.2: 
To show that both b  positive (Proof of Proposition 2(a)): jARjA
−*
In equations (C-7) and (C-8), note that RjAB = (1+θ)(RjA + RjB) and RjAB-RjA = θRjA+(1+θ)RjB. 
When (RjAB-RjA) ≤ V and RjB≤θV (first part of equation (C-7)):   
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 >0 as >(N+1) and (1+θ)(R( )( θ++ 122 N ) jA + RjB)>RjB
Similarly, >0 can be established for the other cases in equations (C-8) and (C-9). jARb jA
−*
Now to show that  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
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jARbR jAjA
*  is positive (Proof of Proposition 2(b)): 
When (RjAB-RjA) ≤ V  (equation (C-7)):   
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which is positive ∀ θ>0 (for the case RjB≤θV). 
Likewise, ( ) ( )[ ]( ) N
N
jAjB
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RRN
jA
jAjA
R
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1
11)(
*
+
+++=∂
∂ − θθθ >0 ∀ θ>0 (for θV <RjB≤V). 
When (RjAB-RjA) > V (equation A-8): ( ) ( ) θθ =∂ ∂=−∂ ∂ jAjAjAjAjA RRRbR *  which is positive for all complements (for RjB≤θV). 
Likewise ( ) ( ) θθ =∂ ∂=−∂ ∂ jAjAjAjAjA RRRbR * > 0 for all complements (for θV<RjB≤V). 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.3:  
The first round winner’s second round bid is bjB=RjAB-RjA (from the equilibria already 
established).  
Note that bjB-RjB =RjAB-RjA -RjB = θ(RjA+RjB) which is positive for all θ>0.  This proves 
Proposition 3 (a[i]).  Part 3(a[ii]) follows immediately because bjB-RjB depends only on j’s 
valuations and θ, and not on bjA or the bids of the other players. 
As shown earlier, first round losers second round bids are b’jB=RjB.  That is, the bids equal their 
individual reservation prices for B.   
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APPENDIX D 
 
Bidding under Risk Aversion: Proofs of Equilibrium Bids and Propositions 2.4(b) & 2.5 
In a market of maximally r sk averse bidders, the equilibrium bids are (i)  i{ }VRRMaxb jABjAjA −= ,**  for all bidders for the first object A; (ii) , the first 
round winner’s bid for object B; and (iii) , the first round loser’s second round bid.   
jAjABjB RRb −=**
jBjB Rb =*'*
As Proposition 5 pertains to the equilibrium bids, I will prove them jointly. 
Maximal risk aversion is the case when the bidder never makes (and never intends to make) a 
loss.   
The second round bids  from Appendix A are weakly dominant and 
independent of the bidders’ risk preferences; it was shown that the bidder can not bid any better 
for the second object.  Thus the results hold with maximal risk aversion, proving Proposition 
5(b). 
jBjBjAjABjB RbRRb =−= *'*** ;
 
On the first round bids: Suppose bidder j bids higher than { }VRRMax jABjA −, .  For instance 
consider a bid { } δδ +−=+=⊕ VRRMaxbb jABjAjA ,** . 
If bidder j wins the first object at a price [ ]⊕⊕ ∈ bbp jA ,**  and loses the second object (or wins the 
object at the amount bid for the second object), her net surplus is negative.  Therefore, as a 
maximally risk averse bidder, any bid greater than  is suboptimal.  Now how about a lower 
bid? 
**
jAb
Consider a bid b⊗ less than .  I show that the bidder can never be better off but could be 
worse off.  If a highest bid p
**
jAb
⊗ from among the other N bidders is between b⊗ and , then j lost 
the opportunity to win A and earn a positive surplus.  If p
**
**
** **
jAb
⊗ is below both b⊗ and , then j got 
no additional benefit by bidding b
jAb
⊗ and not .  Thus,  is weakly dominant.  jAb jAb
 
When { }VRRMax jABjA −,  equals VR jAB − , it means that j’s first bid is greater than her 
reservation price RjA, proving proposition 5(a). 
Further, conforming to maximal risk aversion, bidder j will not make a loss with the above bid 
combination{ }****** ′ { }, , jBjBjA bbb .  When VRRMax jABjA −,  is RjA, j makes a non-negative surplus at 
the end of the first round irrespective of winning or losing A.  If j wins A with this bid, then a 
second round win at RjAB-RjA means a total payout no greater than a total payout no greater than 
RjAB.  When { }VRRMax jABjA −,  is RjAB –V, it means j has a reserve amount V for the second 
auction.  If j wins the first auction, a win on the second is assured – again for a total payout no 
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greater than RjAB.  When j loses the first round, then her second round bid is her valuation RjA; 
i.e., no chance of ending up with a negative surplus. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4(b): 
Here I show that the equilibrium bidding strategy when the bidders are maximally risk averse 
converges to that with risk neutral bidders when the number of bidders is large.  Since the 
optimal bids for the second object are the same under both cases, our proof is limited to the first 
bid. Mathematically, I need to show that ***
1 jAjAN
bbLim =∞→+  or  
where the superscript * and ** represent the risk neutral and maximally risk averse situations 
respectively. 
0)( ***1 =−∞→+ jAjAN bbLim
I consider compare each of the four cases across equations (C-7) and (C-8) with the 
corresponding maximally risk averse bids. 
 
When (RjAB-RjA)<V and θV>RjB:  
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(as each term in the last expression tends to zero individually as θV>RjB and (RjAB-RjA)<V.) 
When (RjAB-RjA)<V and θV>RjB: (Again,  as above;  is as in the 2jAjA Rb =** *jAb nd part of eqn. (C-
8)) 
Thus as N goes to infinity, 
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as each individual term goes to zero because θV≤ RjB≤V and (RjAB-RjA)<V.  
When (RjAB-RjA)>V and θV<RjB: (Now ;  is as in the 1VjABjA Rb −=** *jAb st part of eqn. (C-9)) 
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When (RjAB-RjA)>V and θV<RjB: (  as above;  is as in the 2VjABjA Rb −=** *jAb nd part of eqn. (C-9)) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Asymmetry in Market Level Valuations: Proofs of Equilibrium Bids and Proposition 2.6(b) 
 
The reservation prices for the higher valued object, A (say), are distributed U [0, V] and those for 
the lower valued object B are distributed U [0, v] with v<V.  In 2.5.1, v is set to 0.5V.  The model 
is otherwise similar to the main model.  The equilibrium bids when the objects are auctioned as a 
bundle equal the reservation prices for the bundle, as before.  I focus here on sequential auctions. 
 
The proof is analogous to that in Appendix C.  So while omitting a formal derivation here, I draw 
attention to the following points: 
• The equilibrium second bids correspond to those under symmetry as the decision 
problem facing the bidders at the start of the second auction is identical in both cases.  
The strategic considerations of the bidders are similar as the winner of the first bid is 
the only one with the possible opportunity to tap the value of complementarity 
• The presence of two “parameters” v and V increases the number of different 
thresholds we must consider and makes the analytical derivation more involved. 
The equilibria when object A is auctioned first are as follows: 
For object B: bjB=RjAB-RjA when j is the first round winner;  =R
jB
b′ jB when j is the first round 
loser.   
For object A: 
When (RjAB-RjA)<v and θV<(1+θ)v: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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When (RjAB-RjA)<v and θV>(1+θ)v: 
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When (RjAB-RjA)≥v and θV<(1+θ)v:  
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When (RjAB-RjA)≥v and θV>(1+θ)v: 
)1()2(21
2
*
θθ ++−+−=
+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
N
N
jB
jAjA VvN
R
v
N
N
Rb . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.6(b): 
To show that with sequential auctions involving asymmetrically valued objects, it is revenue 
maximizing for the seller to auction the higher valued object first.   
 
I prove the proposition graphically.  I consider θ values of 0.1 and 0.2 over which sequential 
auctions are typically better for the seller than the auction of the bundle.  For each combination 
(N+1, θ) in the range shown below, I simulate 30,000 auctions each for two scenarios: when the 
higher valued object is auction first or second.  I compare the expected revenues from the two 
sequences. The results are shown in figure 5. 
 
..….……………………………..Insert Figure 5 about here…...……………………………… 
 
The % revenue gain along the vertical axis below is the percentage increase in revenue to the 
seller by auctioning the higher valued object first and the lower valued object second, and not 
vice versa.   
 
The graph is positive everywhere confirming the proposition.  Some higher order effect can also 
be seen.  Notably, the significance of sequencing is higher when the degree of complementarity 
is greater.  The importance of sequencing is diminishing in the size of the bidder pool.   
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APPENDIX F 
 
Bidding for Substitutes: Proofs of Equilibrium Bids 
 
The proofs closely parallel those in Appendix C.  The key difference is that the sub-additive 
valuation of the bundle (reflected by the negative θ) may make one item unattractive to the 
holder of the other item.  Thus, in modifying Appendix A for substitutes, I replace RjAB in 
equation (C-1) to { }
jB
,
jA
,
jABjAB
RRRR Max=⊕ .  This reflects the free disposal property discussed 
in section 3.5.2.  When the objects are auctioned as a bundle (i.e., a single composite unit), 
bidding  is a weakly dominant strategy.  The following proof relates to sequential auctions. ⊕
jAB
R
 
Akin to that in Appendix A for complements (for similar reasons), the bidder j’s optimal second 
bid when she is the first round winner is ; if the first auction is lost, she bids 
.   
jAjABjB
RRb −⊕=*
jBjB
Rb =′*
 
In arriving at the equilibrium first bid, three possibilities must be identified (see Figure below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   0   V 
)),1/(( VV θθ +−  
))1/(,( θθ +− VV
V { }
Iregion  in this ,
Max
             
 
iA
iB
,
iA
,
iABiAB
R
RRRR
=
=⊕
  
Bidder i’s 
reservation 
price for A 
(RiA) 
iABiAB RR =⊕  in this region II 
iBiAB RR =⊕  in this region III 
Bidder i’s reservation 
price for B (RiB)  
 
Now consider the case when ; that is, A taken alone is the most preferred.  Therefore, j 
gains by bidding this amount for it.  If j wins the first round, then she should bid an amount of 
zero for B (as ).  If j loses on the first round, then . 
jAjAB RR =⊕
0)(* == −⊕
jAjABjB
RRb
jBjB
Rb =′*
When , I assume as before that the highest bid for the first object has an everywhere 
differentiable cdf.  The optimal bid function is given by: 
jAjAB
RR ≠⊕
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1
                                                            (F-1) 
We need to evaluate the term H(z) where z , to identify the 
equilibrium. 
}kBj,ki
'
iB ,b}Max{Max{b ≠=
The bidder’s problem in the case of substitutes is thus largely the same as with complements.  
However, there are some differences. First, with substitutes, RjAB-RjA <V.  Second, there is the 
issue of free disposal.  The latter plays a role in the evaluation of H(z) when bidder j decides the 
bid for the second object after losing the first.  To do so, we need the distribution of the random 
variable =x where k is the winner of A.  I obtain this from the above diagram in 
which  in region I,  in II and =  in III.   
kAkABkB
RRb −⊕=
0=−⊕
kAkAB
RR
kAkABkAkAB
RRRR −−⊕ =
kAkAB
RR −⊕
kAkB
RR −
 
This figure allows us to evaluate the following probabilities: 
P[RkAB –RkA<x│ = R⊕
kAB
R kAB].P[ = R⊕
kAB
R kAB] 
P[RkB –RkA<x│ = R⊕
kAB
R kB].P[ = R⊕
kAB
R kB] and  
P[RkA –RkA<x│ = R⊕
kAB
R kA].P[ = R⊕
kAB
R iA]= P[ = R⊕
kAB
R kA]. 
This allows us to evaluate and solve for in equation (F-1).  This 
yields us the following equilibrium for the first round bid: 
)},,,
'{( kBkiiiA bbMaxMax ≠
*
jAb
1. When =R⊕jABR jA: bjA
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2. When =R⊕jABR jB: 
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Case 2b:  (1+2θ)V ≤ (RjB-RjA)≤ (1+2θ)V/(1+θ) 
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Case 2c19: V(1+2θ)/(1+θ)< RjB-RjA<V 
bjA*=
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19 In this expression, the value of P[(1+2θ)V≤RjAB-RjA≤ (1+2θ)V/(1+θ)]= [(1+2θ)/(1+θ)](θ/2) is very small and we 
have set it to zero. 
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3. When =R⊕jABR jAB
Case 3a: 0≤RjB ≤ (1+2θ)V 
bjA*=
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Case 3b:  (1+2θ) V≤ RjB-RjA≤ (1+2θ)V/(1+θ) 
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Table 1 
 
Essay 1 and Essay 2: A Contrast 
 
 Essay 1 Essay 2 
Object Nature Independent and 
interdependent values 
Independent private valuation 
only 
Auction Format Comparison of English outcry 
and hybrid auction formats 
Second price sealed bid 
auction 
Number of bidders  Exogenous Exogenous but considered as a 
variable 
Number of objects Single item Two items 
Seller Problem Choice between auction 
formats 
Choice between 
bundling/unbundling 
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Table 2 
 
Essay 1: Summary of Data Collected for eBay and Yahoo 
(n=200 matched auctions) 
 
Data  Yahoo eBay Difference 
Number of Bidders 
(Average)  
5.26 7.00 Significant** 
Presence of Common 
value 
NA 138  
Auction Duration 
(Average) 
 
5.55 (Mode = 7 
Days) 
5.63 (Mode =7 
Days) 
Not Significant 
Presence of Last 
Minute Bidding 
 
62 out of 200 88 out of 200 Significant* 
*   indicates significance at p<. 05 
** indicates significance at p<. 01 
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Table 3 
 
Essay 1: Summary of Restrictions Tested for Propositions 1,2,3 and 4 
 
Short Summary of 
Propositions 
Constraints 
Tested 
Result if proposition is 
supported 
Observed Result 
Proposition 1.1:  
With Common Values, 
Revenue Greater for 
eBay than for Yahoo. 
α1=α2 (1a) 
α1+b1=α2’ 
(1b)  
Model 1a 
and 1b 
Reject (expect α1>α2) 
Reject (expect α1 + b1> 
α2’). Also expect first 
inequality (α1>α2) to be 
stronger than the second 
(α1 + b1> α2’). 
Both restrictions 
rejected and second 
inequality stronger 
as seen by F statistic. 
Parameter for 
Common value in 
eBay positive and 
significant. 
Proposition 1.2: 
Revenue Increases 
with number of 
bidders. 
 b2=0 
γ2=0 
Model 1a 
and 1b 
Reject (expect b2, γ2 >0) Proposition partially 
supported for 
Yahoo! only as 
coefficient (b2) for 
eBay not significant. 
(Details in Table 3) 
Proposition 1.3: Rate 
of increase of revenue 
with duration greater 
for Yahoo than for 
eBay. 
γ1 = λ1, 
γ2 = λ2  
Models 2a 
and 2b 
 
Reject (expect γ1 > λ1 and 
γ2 > λ2 ) in models 2a and 
2b 
We see γ1 > λ1 and γ2 
> λ2  
Both results in the 
expected direction 
and proposition 
supported 
Proposition 1.4: 
Impact of Last Minute 
Bidding greater in 
eBay than in Yahoo. 
  
γ’1 = λ’1 , 
γ’2 = λ’2 
 
Models 3a 
and 3b 
 
Reject (expect γ’1 > λ’1 
and γ’2 < λ’2 )
in models 3a and 3b 
 
We see γ’1 > λ’1 and 
γ’2 < λ’2  
Both results in 
expected direction 
and proposition 
supported 
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Essay 1: Results of sequentially relaxing constraints on coefficients of Model 1a and 1b for testing proposition 1.1 
 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 
Restrictions 
(refer 
Models 1a 
and 1b) 
 γ2=b2, γ3=b3, 
γ4=b4, γ5=b5, γ6=b6
γ3=b3, 
γ4=b4, γ5=b5, γ6=b6
γ3=b3, 
γ5=b5, γ6=b6
γ3=b3, 
γ6=b6
γ3=b3 Unrestricted 
Restriction 
Tested 
 α1=α2 α1+b1 
=α2’
 α1=α2 α1+b1 
=α2’
  α1=α2 α1+b1 
=α2’
 α1=α2 α1+b1 
=α2’
 α1=α2 α1+b1 
=α2’
 α1=α2 α1+b1 
=α2’
 Without
CV 
 With CV Without 
CV 
With CV Without 
CV 
With CV Without 
CV 
With CV Without 
CV 
With CV Without 
CV 
With CV 
Ebay A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 D2 E1 E2 F1 F2
Intercept 
(α1) 
323.93***            295.53*** 323.81*** 289.07*** 323.75*** 288.41*** 320.63*** 285.53*** 320.67*** 285.60*** 309.84*** 274.97***
COMM(b1)            
       
             
            
            
             
            
42.07* 51.28**
 
52.16**
 
51.87**
 
51.80**
 
51.65**
 BIDS (b2) 4.53 3.35 3.30 0.62 2.93 0.12 3.31 0.52 3.20 0.44 2.76 .02
LAST(b3) -7.90 -7.24 -7.53 -6.35 -7.59 -6.42 -6.02 -4.88 -5.87 -4.78 23.21 2.46
RESERVE 
(b4) 
0.22** 0.22** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.16** 0.15* 0.15* 0.13 0.15* 0.13 0.15* 0.13
BUYNOW 
(b5) 
7.37 9.78 6.62 8.92 8.99 11.81 80.62 82.61 77.77 80.61 56.38 59.42
DUR (b6) 2.98 2.74 3.33 3.41 3.69 3.83 3.62 3.77 2.55 3.03 1.99 2.46
Yahoo 
Intercept 
(α2) 
250.53***            295.53*** 250.05*** 249.68*** 249.53*** 249.05*** 251.02*** 250.51*** 250.91*** 250.44*** 255.72*** 255.17**
JUMP(γ1) 5.87            
            
            
            
            
            
            
2.25 8.55 6.85 11.10 9.98 8.16 7.10 8.82 7.56 14.43 13.10
BIDS (γ2) 4.53 3.35 5.75* 5.56* 6.06** 5.94** 6.41** 6.28** 6.58** 6.40** 7.42** 7.23**
LAST(γ3) -7.90 -7.24 -7.53 -6.35 -7.59 -6.43 -6.02 -4.88 -5.87 -4.78 -24.08 -22.71
RESERVE 
(γ4) 
0.22** 0.22** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***
BUY 
PRICE (γ5) 
7.37 9.78 6.62 8.92 8.99 11.81 -7.02 -3.95 -7.14 -4.03 -9.37 -6.27
DUR (γ6) 2.98 2.74 3.33 3.41 3.69 3.84 3.62 3.77 3.89 3.96 3.84 3.91
F Value for 
Restriction 
22.95 25.70 22.64 26.27 21.55 25.11 17.81 21.52 17.83 21.51 7.58 11.01
P-value .005            .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0062 .0010
Table 4 
 
Table 5 
Results for Regression 2 
Model 2a  EPrice=γ1t + γ2t2 + ε 
Model 2b YPrice=λ1t + λ2t2 + ε 
 
t?time elapsed from first bid as a fraction of total duration 
 
 
Model Parameter Estimate Adjusted R2
2a γ1 0.64*** 0.78 
 γ2 0.36***  
2b λ1 0.45*** 0.71 
 λ2 0.55***  
*   indicates significance at P<. 10 
** indicates significance at p<.05 
***indicates significance at P<. 01 
 
Results for Regression 3 
Model 3a  EPrice’=γ’1t + γ’2t2 + ε 
Model 3b YPrice’=λ’1t + λ’2t2 + ε 
t?time elapsed after 80% of the auction duration is over. 
EPrice, YPrice: Price above the price when 80% of the auction was over in eBay and Yahoo respectively.. 
Model Parameter Estimate Adjusted R2
2a γ’1 0.35*** 0.78 
 γ’2 0.65***  
2b λ’1 0.03 0.71 
 λ’2 0.97***  
*   indicates significance at P<. 10 
** indicates significance at p<.05 
***indicates significance at P<. 01
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Table 6 
Essay 2: Positioning Essay 2 vis-à-vis Extant Articles on Multi-Object Auctions 
 
Study Scope/Key Findings Distinctive Aspects of Our Study 
Benoit & 
Krishna 
(2001) 
• In an English auction setting, when 
bidders are budget constrained and 
have common value of two 
complements or substitutes, B&K 
demonstrate anecdotally that a bundled 
(sequential) auction is revenue 
maximizing for strong complements 
(otherwise) 
• Our bidders have independent private 
values and are not budget constrained, but 
follow incentive compatibility & 
individual rationality  
• Unlike B&K, I derive closed form Nash 
equilibrium bidding strategies; results 
underscore a wide domain of optimality 
for sequential auctions even w|o budget 
constraints  
Bernhardt 
& Scoones 
(1994) 
• Given a two-object case with at least 
three bidders in a Vickrey sealed-bid 
auction setting, the seller’s expected 
revenues are greater when the object for 
which buyers’ valuations are more 
dispersed is auctioned first 
• Interrelatedness and bidders’ risk 
propensity that I model are not within the 
scope of the B&S study 
• I assume that the dispersions in valuations 
for the two objects are similar 
Chakrabo-
rty (1999, 
2002) 
• With additive valuations for two non-
identical objects, in a Vickrey auction 
when bidder have independent private 
value, unbundling (bundling) is more 
profitable when the number of bidders 
is below (exceeds) a critical number  
• When bidders have common values, 
bundling additionally reduces the 
problem of winner’s curse 
• Our model considers complements and 
substitutes with independent objects as a 
special case.  
• Though the objects are IPV, there is an 
analogous situation as that of the winners 
curse as it is optimal for the bidders to bid 
more than their valuations so that there is 
a possibility for the bidder to incur losses. 
Feng & 
Chatterjee 
(2002) 
• When each of several risk neutral 
bidder seeks only one good at the most 
in a Vickrey auction, the price decline 
anomaly is possible 
• Sequential (or simultaneous) auctions 
are optimal when the bidder to good 
ratio is small (or large)   
• F&C do not examine interrelatedness and 
bidders’ risk propensity that I model 
• Issues such as bidders’ uncertainty over 
the number of auctions and product 
quantity, and signaling are not within our 
purview 
Hausch 
(1986) 
• The optimality of sequential vs. 
simultaneous auctions is examined for 
two identical objects and with two 
bidders, within on a signaling 
framework 
• Sequential (or simultaneous) auctions 
increase seller’s expected revenue when 
the first auction is (not) expected to be 
“non-revealing” 
• The impact of interrelatedness among 
objects (complements vs. substitutes), the 
number of bidders and their risk 
propensity is not within Hausch’s purview  
• Bidders in our setting have unambiguous 
and independent private value.  The scope 
and nature of our results are different 
Levin 
(1997) 
• In a mechanism design/optimal 
auctions context, given a pair of 
complements, a seller is always better 
off selling them as a bundle. In this 
study, the valuations of the objects are 
• Our model is flexible in that the valuations 
are independent realizations so that there 
is reduction of heterogeneity in the 
valuation of bundles yielding different 
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driven by a common iid signal. results. 
Palfrey 
(1983) 
• For a monopolist with one unit of each 
of several independent goods, a 
bundled auction is preferable in a 
Vickrey auction setting when there only 
a “small” number of buyers.   
• Unlike Palfrey, I examine the products’ 
interrelatedness and bidders’ risk 
propensity (although I do not examine 
welfare issues) 
• I demonstrate the unbundling has greater 
appeal for the seller than suggested in 
Palfrey  
This Study • Sequential, unbundled auctions 
maximize seller’s revenue even for 
moderate complements when there are 
at least a few bidders (four or more) 
• The domain of sequential auctions is 
larger when the bidders are risk neutral 
(and not risk averse) 
• When object valuations are 
asymmetric, the more valuable good 
should be auctioned first 
 
 
Not Applicable 
 
 
Figure 1 
Essay 1: Progression of Price With Respect to Time in eBay and Yahoo! for Model 2 and Model 320
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20 The X-axis is time as a fraction of total time and the Y-axis is the outstanding price as a fraction of th nstance in 1a, the point (0.50,0.75) 
would indicate that at the halfway mark in the auction, the outstanding price attained is ¾ of the final price realized. Again, in 1b, (0.9,0.5) would indicate that 
after 98% of the time is over (as (0.98-0.8)/0.20=0.9), the outstanding price is halfway between the final price and the price when 80% of the auction was over. 
The first graph (a) is for the entire auction duration. The second graph (b) is for the final fifth of the duration (i.e. price progression after 4/5 of the auction is 
over). These plots show that (i) In general, the prices in eBay move towards the final price faster than that in Yahoo and (ii) The difference in the speed of 
convergence towards the final price in eBay is more  
Price in Yahoo 
e final price. For i
X axis: Time elapsed after 80% of 
the auction is over as a fraction of 
the total time (last 20%) 
Y axis: Price beyond the price at the 
80% stage of the auction duration as 
a fraction of final price 
Price in eBay 
Figure 1b X axis: Time elapsed as a fraction of 
total time 
Y axis: Price reached at 
corresponding time as a fraction of 
final price 
Price in Yahoo 
pronounced during the final stages of the auction.  
Price in eBay 
Figure 1a 
 
 Figure 2 
 
Essay 2: The Sequential Bidding Game in Essay 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 1. Degree of interrelatedness θ and number of bidders N+1 are common knowledge.  
2. Individual level reservation prices RjA, RjB for objects A and B are private value.  
3. Seller moves first and decides whether to bundle or not. 
 
 
 
Bidder j 
wins AB
Bidder j 
bids RjAB
Bidder j bids for A
Sequential Auctions: 
A is auctioned first 
Auction of the Bundle 
Bidder j 
loses AB
Bidder j wins A
Highest bidder pays 
second highest bid
Bidder j 
loses A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bidder j bids 
for B
 
 
 
 
Bidder j 
wins B
 Bidder j 
loses B Bidder j 
wins B Bidder j 
loses B
 
 
 
 
 
 Highest bidder for object A pays second highest bid for A. 
Likewise, highest bidder for object B pays second highest bid for B. 
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 Figure 3 
 
Essay 2: Optimality of Sequential and Bundled Auctions for Complements 
 
Figure 3A: Main Model with Risk Neutral Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2  3  4  5  6  7 8  9 10 11 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.0 
θ ≈0.36 
Auction of the bundle is 
optimal for the seller 
Sequential auctions are 
optimal for the seller 
Degree of 
Complementarity 
θ 
 
     Number of Bidders (N+1) 
 
Figure 3B: Extension with Maximally Risk Averse Bidders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2  3  4  5  6  7 8  9 10 11 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.0 
Auction of the bundle is 
optimal for the seller 
θ ≈0.33 
θ ≈0.36 
Sequential auctions are 
optimal for the seller 
Degree of 
Complementarity 
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(Note: The dotted line in Figure 3B represents the indifference frontier for the risk neutral case 
from Figure 3A.) 
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Figure 4 
 
Essay 2: Asymmetric Complements: Optimality of Sequential and Bundled Auctions 
(Bidders are Risk Neutral) 
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(Note:  1. The dotted line in the figure represents the indifference frontier for the symmetric 
case from Figure 4A. 
 2. Reservation prices for the more valuable object are distributed U [0, V] while 
those for the other object are U [0, 0.5V].  The higher valued object is auctioned 
first.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 110
 Figure 5 
 
Essay 2: Asymmetric Objects: Optimal vs Suboptimal Sequencing 
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Figure 5: The graph is positive everywhere confirming the proposition.  Some higher order effect 
can also be seen.  Notably, the significance of sequencing is higher when the degree of 
complementarity is greater.  The importance of sequencing is diminishing in the size of the 
bidder pool.   
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Figure 6 
 
Essay 2: Substitutes vs Complements: Optimality of Sequential and Bundled Auctions 
(Risk Neutral Bidders) 
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